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Article 3

Changing Federal Statutory Proposals to
Address Domestic Violence at Work
CREATING A SOCIETAL RESPONSE BY MAKING
BUSINESSES A PART OF THE SOLUTION
Marcy L. Karin†
INTRODUCTION
Over five million acts of domestic violence are committed every
year. The prevalence of these acts makes domestic violence “the leading
cause of injury to women.”2 Detrimental wherever they occur, these acts
are not limited to the privacy of one’s home. Instead, domestic violence
regularly and repeatedly spills over to the “public” workplace.
1

†
Legislative Counsel, Workplace Flexibility 2010; Adjunct Professor of Law, Federal
Legislation and Administrative Clinic, Georgetown University Law Center. Many thanks to Chai
Feldblum, Jane Aiken, Chantel Sheaks, Amy Schoenhard, Paula Shapiro, Paige Willan, Katie
Corrigan, Liz Watson, Kevin Barry, Jessica Glenn, Nan Hunter, and the staff of the Brooklyn Law
Review for their invaluable feedback and support.
1
NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (CDC), COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED
STATES 1 (2003), http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipv_cost/IPVBook-Final-Feb18.pdf (reporting
on data from the National Violence Against Women Survey, which estimated 5.3 million acts of
domestic violence against women who are at least eighteen years old happens annually).
No single act defines domestic violence. In general, domestic violence occurs when
one or more persons uses intimidation, physical violence, threats, coercion, emotional, sexual, and/or
economic abuse to exert power and control over another person or persons. Thus, a range of
activities may constitute domestic violence, including but not limited to name-calling, intimidation,
pinching, slapping, hitting, strangling, assault, or homicide (or threatening or attempting any of these
activities). It may also include financial manipulation or control such as removing a spouse from
joint accounts, or changing a partner’s allowance without notice or cause. Other terms sometimes
used synonymously with or describing some aspect of domestic violence include: workplace
violence, domestic abuse, intimate violence, intimate partner violence, stalking, physical abuse,
sexual abuse, sexual assault, psychological abuse, dating violence, relationship abuse, and family
violence. See, e.g., id. at 8; Jennifer E. Swanberg et al., Intimate Partner Violence, Employment, and
the Workplace: Consequences and Future Directions, 6 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 286, 289
(2005).
2
118 CONG. REC. S10737-8 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2005) (statement of Sen. Murray).
While domestic violence impacts both men and women, approximately 85% of victims of domestic
violence are women. Margaret Graham Tebo, When Home Comes to Work, 91 A.B.A. J. 42, 42
(2005). In 2001, women were “subject to approximately 13,000 acts of workplace violence each year
that [were] perpetrated by a husband or boyfriend.” Bonnie Campbell & Marcy L. Karin, Beyond
“Going Postal”: Responding to Everyday Violence in the Workplace, 7 WORKPLACE VIOLENCE
PREVENTION REP. 1, 1 (2001). Domestic violence is also prevalent in same-sex relationships. Joanna
Bunker Rohrbaugh, Domestic Violence in Same-Gender Relationships, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 287, 28788 (2006). It also crosses all socioeconomic, racial, ethnic, and religious backgrounds, although
some reports conclude that domestic violence disproportionately affects the poor.
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For example, Francescia La Rose’s former boyfriend called her
supervisor and threatened to come to the office to kill La Rose if she was
not fired. Her employer responded by warning La Rose to keep her
personal problems out of the workplace. The next day, the ex-boyfriend
walked into the building where La Rose worked, past the security guard,
and shot and killed her. La Rose’s family filed a wrongful death case
against her employer claiming that the employer failed to adequately
protect La Rose after being notified of a specific threat.3 In another
example, a perpetrator of abuse began harassing his target’s coworkers
after the perpetrator was served with a protection order sought by the
targeted employee. Neither the employer nor the coworkers had standing
to seek a protection order in response to this new harassment.4
These stories are not the only ones that can be told. In fact,
domestic violence has a significant impact on America’s workplaces.
Individuals subjected to abuse, their coworkers, and other third parties
(like volunteers, contractors, and customers) all suffer consequences as a
result of domestic violence that occurs or spills over into the workplace.
One out of every five employed adults is a victim of domestic violence,5
and 96% of victims have experienced trouble at work related to domestic
violence.6 Employees experience decreased productivity during and after
actual or threatened violence and may require time off from work to
address safety concerns, medical needs, and legal issues.
In addition, employers need to address the consequences of
domestic violence. America’s workplaces are faced with significant
economic losses from lost productivity, administrative difficulties when
employees take unplanned time off, increased medical costs and
insurance premiums, and the threat of liability for firing employees
experiencing domestic violence in hopes of maintaining a safe workplace
or for failing to adopt and/or enforce appropriate domestic violence
3

La Rose v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., No. 9322684 (214th Dist. Ct., Harris
County, Tex. Dec. 5, 1994). The suit was reportedly settled for $850,000. Donald F. Burke, When
Employees Are Vulnerable, Employers Are Too, NAT’L L. J., Jan. 17, 2000, at B11; Jean Hellwege,
Claims for Domestic Violence in the Workplace May Be on the Rise, TRIAL, May 1, 1995, at 94; see
also Sarah M. Buel, The Impact of Domestic Violence on Children: Recommendations to Improve
Interventions 42-43 (2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.childscryforhelp.com/
domesticvindex.html.
4
Hearing Before the Nev. S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 71st Sess. (May 9, 2001)
[hereinafter Nevada Senate Hearing] (statement of Debra S. Jacobson, Lobbyist, Southwest Gas
Corp.), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/71st/Minutes/Senate/JUD/Final/1332.html.
5
Press Release, Corporate Alliance to End Partner Violence, Domestic Violence Exerts
Significant Impact on America’s Workplaces, Benchmark (Oct. 11, 2005), available at
http://www.caepv.org/about/releasedetail.php?prID=89. Of course, it is important to remember that a
significant amount of domestic violence goes unreported. Nina G. Stillman, Workplace Violence,
697 PLI/LIT 39, 54 (2003) (noting a Bureau of Justice Statistic’s finding that less than half of
incidents of domestic violence are reported to the police on average).
6
WOMEN’S BUREAU, DEP’T OF LABOR, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A WORKPLACE ISSUE 1
(1996); Nicole Buonocore Porter, Victimizing The Abused?: Is Termination the Solution When
Domestic Violence Comes to Work?, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 287 (2006) (internal citation
omitted).
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prevention policies. Generally speaking, however, the business
community has not yet realized the significant burden domestic violence
imposes or changed the usual employer response of ignoring a
“personal” problem or taking ill-advised actions that result in further
negative legal and practical consequences.
Despite these real consequences, the workplace is not the first
societal structure that most people think of when they think of changes
that are needed to address domestic violence. Instead, when most people
think of solutions to the problem of domestic violence, they think of
things like increased education on how to prevent the cycle of abuse,
changes that need to be made to the prosecution of related crimes, or
increasing emergency housing for victims and their children.7 In many
respects, this represents a significant service that past feminist
scholarship on domestic violence has made—it recognizes that domestic
violence is not simply a private matter. Rather, it is a public problem that
is in need of a societal solution.
However, by not thinking of the workplace in response to this
question, a significant area for which change is needed is missed. There
is a legitimate basis for proposing a societal solution to domestic
violence that is rooted in employment law. There are already various
rules that are being used to respond to the effects of domestic violence at
work (e.g., tort law, statutory leave laws, occupational safety regulations,
etc.). This Article argues that the workplace has a greater affirmative role
to play in reducing the impact of domestic violence on the workplace.
Moreover, society has an obligation to create a coherent structure and
system for this issue to be addressed.
This Article argues that the best way to do that is through a
federal approach. The federal government has an affirmative societal role
to play in pushing the workplace to confront this issue. Moreover, there
is utility for a societal solution to this problem that engages the
workplace directly to respond to domestic violence and reduce its impact
on the victim and others. Obviously, a federal approach will result in the
consideration of complicated legal terrain that involves both
constitutional issues and conceptual federalism issues as to the proper
role of the federal and state governments. (The latter is necessary
because the federal government would need to work with the state
structures already in existence.) But it is worth trying to figure this out.
This Article makes the case that there is a crucial role for the federal
7
See, e.g., James Martin Truss, The Subjection of Women . . . Still: Unfulfilled Promises
of Protection for Women Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY’S L. J. 1149, 1156, 1201
(1995) (emphasizing the importance of educating law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges
about violent relationships); Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1505-18 (1993) (noting that an integrated solution for fighting domestic
violence, which includes at least shelters, protection orders, prosecution, and education, is needed);
Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System’s Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem,
Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267, 321-27 (1985) (advocating for an improved criminal
response to abuse, including stronger prosecution).
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government to play and that it can do so both creatively and
constitutionally.
Part I of the Article makes the case that domestic violence has
significant ramifications in the workplace and analyzes some of the
structural problems with the workplace that currently make it difficult to
appropriately deal with domestic violence. Part II canvasses the state
laws that have been passed or proposed to address domestic violence at
work. This analysis provides us with a good sense of the experiences of
employees and employers in this area as well as a rich basis of practice to
draw on in considering the appropriate federal response. Part III
describes two of the current federal proposals to address the problem of
domestic violence at work.8 These bills attempt to address a real need of
employees by providing victims of domestic violence with, among other
things, up to thirty days of unpaid job protected leave. But they provide
employers little or no assistance in addressing the effects domestic
violence has on the employers. Drawing on the lessons from the state
laws, as well as from the author’s personal experience working at the
federal legislative level, this Article suggests several changes to the
proposed federal bills that will make it more likely that the protections
needed to address the problems caused by domestic violence at work will
actually be obtained and that will offer businesses a reason to support—
or at least not oppose—these bills.
In essence, this Article proposes three ways to amend these bills
to provide a societal response to the problem of domestic violence at
work: (1) reframing the bills to reflect the effect on employers and
society; (2) providing employers with the ability to go to court to seek a
protection order; and (3) creating a refundable tax credit to recoup a
percentage of costs related to prevention, education, and safety policies
and programs. Together, these changes could have a significant impact
on the potential of these bills to transform the normative response to
domestic violence at work and address the very real public ramifications
of domestic violence on both employees and employers.
The goal throughout this piece is, therefore, to consider how law
can be used as a vehicle for transforming the norm of the workplace as it
responds to what has often been perceived of as the “private” problem of
domestic violence. This Article is part of a small, but growing body of
scholarship aimed at exposing the impacts of domestic violence on
employees and employers. By suggesting ways that the federal
government can more effectively engage in this issue to respond to the
needs of all members of the workplace, this Article attempts to move the
conversation forward on a theoretical, strategic, and practical level.

8

Survivors’ Empowerment and Economic Security (SEES) Act, S. 1136, 110th Cong.
(2007); Security and Financial Empowerment (SAFE) Act, H.R. 2395, 110th Cong. (2007); see infra
Section III for information on these bills and the proposals to change them.
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THE PROBLEM—THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT
WORK AND STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS PREVENTING AN
EFFECTIVE WORKPLACE RESPONSE

In 2001, Bonnie Campbell (the first director of the Violence
Against Women Office at the Department of Justice) and I co-wrote an
article that stated, “Employer-initiated prevention efforts are the frontline in this fight [against domestic and workplace violence], and
employers ignore the problem at their own peril.”9 It might seem
counterintuitive to concentrate efforts to address domestic violence on
the workplace or on what employers—as opposed to employees—need
to respond to this problem. It is not that other aspects of this fight are not
also important. For example, there is a need to increase recognition of a
privilege between counselors/advocates and victims of domestic
violence10 and for alleviating policies that systematically remove the
children of victims of domestic violence because the victims “failed to
protect” the children by “allowing” them to witness the abuse.11
But, focusing only on criminal and family law misses an
opportunity to address the bigger picture. The same is true in crafting
domestic violence policy for the workplace that only considers the needs
of victim employees. An effective national policy on domestic violence
must reflect an understanding of the impact that domestic violence has
on the workplace, including the problems for both employees and
employers, some of which result from the structure of the workplace
itself. This section explores that impact, including the effects of domestic
violence on the workplace and the tolls imposed on employees and
employers. It also examines some of the structural problems within the
typical workplace that currently make it difficult to address issues related
to domestic violence.
A.

The Significant Toll on Employees

Acts of domestic violence often occur while a victim is at work
because work is the one place where perpetrators know they will be able
to find their victims.12 While precise numbers are difficult to find,13
9

Campbell & Karin, supra note 2, at 7.
See, e.g., Domestic Violence Victim Confidentiality Protection Act of 2005, D.C.
CODE § 14-310 (2005).
11
This was the issue in the widely publicized case of Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d
840 (N.Y. 2004). I was part of a team that drafted an amicus brief on behalf of the Pennsylvania
Coalition Against Domestic Violence and thirty-three other state domestic violence organizations
that supported the position that the removal of a child from his or her non-offending parent is not in
the child’s best interest where the sole basis for removal is a finding that the child has witnessed an
act of domestic violence against his or her mother.
12
ALABAMA COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & VERIZON WIRELESS,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE: A GUIDE FOR EMPLOYERS 3 (2006), available at
http://www.acadv.org/DVManualPDF2.pdf.
13
Domestic violence is often underreported. See Stillman, supra note 5, at 54-55.
10
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studies have documented the negative impact on women’s economic
stability resulting from domestic violence. For example, a recent Bureau
of Labor Statistics Report found that approximately 31% of female
employees that died at work did so from “interpersonal assaults.”14
Although it often gets the most media attention, violence at work comes
in more forms than just shootings. Domestic violence impacts victim
employees’ day to day experiences at work.
A significant number of victims report being subjected to
adverse employment actions that resulted in part from dealing with
domestic violence. Recently, the General Accounting Office reported
that 25% to 50% of victims lost a job at least in part due to domestic
violence and 55% to 85% took time off as a result of the abuse.15 In
2002, the National Employment Law Project (“NELP”) reported survey
results that broke down the “time off” category further. According to
NELP, domestic violence caused 56% of victimized employees to be late
for work at least five times per month; 28% to leave work early at least
five times per month; and 54% to miss at least three days of work per
month.16 The NELP survey also found that 74% of employed victims
were harassed at work.17 Finally, 96% of employed victims reported that
domestic violence impacted their ability to perform their jobs.18
Violence also impacts coworkers’ work experiences. Among
other things, other employees may have to cover for distracted or absent
coworkers, guard targeted employees from harassing calls or visitors,
resent time off or accommodations given to targeted employees, or fear
14
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CENSUS OF FATAL
OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES (2001) (also reporting that 14% of men that died at work did so from these
types of assaults).
15
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PREVALENCE AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT AMONG WELFARE RECIPIENTS 7-9, 18-19 (1998); see also NAT’L
EMP. L. PROJECT (NELP), UNEMP. INS. FOR SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 1 (2003) (“Onequarter of battered women say they had to quit work at least partly due to domestic violence. Onehalf of women who survive sexual assaults say they had to quit work due to the assault.”). A Senate
report included information from another survey with similar results that found approximately half
of sexual assault survivors lost their jobs after the assault. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 n.69 (1993)
(citing E. Ellis et al., An Assessment of Long-Term Reaction to Rape, 90 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL.
264 (1981)). Additionally, domestic violence has been reported as the direct cause of job loss by 5%
to 27% of victims in cross-sectional studies. Swanberg et al., supra note 1, at 296; see also Jennifer
E. Swanberg & Caroline Macke, Intimate Partner Violence and the Workplace: Consequences and
Disclosure, 21 AFFILIA: J. WOMEN & SOC. WORK, 391, 394 (2006) (explaining that “studies have
found that employers sometimes respond to . . . incidents [of domestic violence] that are perpetrated
on the job by firing the victims”). Studies also demonstrate that domestic violence victims have
trouble with long-term employment security. Jennifer E. Swanberg & T.K. Logan, Domestic
Violence and Employment: A Qualitative Study, 10 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCH. 3, 3 (2005).
16
NELP, supra note 15.
17
Id.; see also Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, 150 CONG. REC. S3124-02,
S3152 (2004) (statement of Sen. Patty Murray) (estimating “that 75 percent of victims of domestic
violence are harassed at work by their abuser”); but see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note
15, at 19 (reporting that 35% to 56% of employed victims were harassed at work by their abusers).
18
NELP, supra note 15; MAINE DEP’T OF LABOR & FAMILY CRISIS SERVS., DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE SURVIVORS AT WORK: HOW PERPETRATORS IMPACT EMPLOYMENT 4 (2005), available at
http://www.maine.gov/labor/labor_stats/publications/dvreports/survivorstudy.pdf.
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that their own safety could be in danger.19 In response to a question about
workplace safety in a 2005 study, 30% of employees responded that
perpetrators of violence visited the workplace and 38% feared for their
own safety as a result.20
These studies make one thing clear: domestic violence causes
employees to walk a tightrope in balancing their work and private lives.
Acts of domestic violence cause victims to arrive late, leave early, and
otherwise miss work to care for their injuries.21 Employees utilize
employers’ resources such as phone, email, and security personnel to
seek recluse from acts of violence.22 And a steady paycheck is often the
key to a victim’s economic independence and safety from abuse.23
Employees “should not have to choose between their safety and their
jobs.”24 Unfortunately, a number of employees are faced with this choice.
B.

The Business Case—Why Employers Need to Care

Given the impact of domestic violence on employees at work, it
is not hard to imagine that there will be significant adverse impacts on
employers as well.25 The impact of domestic violence on employers’
bottom lines has been documented.26 According to the Centers for
19

The federal government encourages targeted employees to rely on coworkers to
“help . . . by screening phone calls and keeping an eye out for” the alleged perpetrator. OFFICE OF
PERSONNEL MGMT., FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RESPONDING TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: WHERE
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES CAN FIND HELP, at http://www.opm.gov/employment_and_
benefits/worklife/officialdocuments/handbooksguides/domesticviolence_help/index.asp (last visited
Sept. 22, 2008).
20
Press Release, Corporate Alliance to End Partner Violence, supra note 5 (results from
a national survey asking employees about the impact of domestic violence in the workplace); see
also Jennifer Swanberg et al., Working Women Making it Work, J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 292,
302 tbl.3 (2007) (describing the interference tactics related to work that victims in a study reported
experiencing, ranging from being physically restrained from getting to work to being stalked at
work).
21
Ralph Henry, Domestic Violence and the Failures of Welfare Reform: The Role for
Work Leave Legislation, 20 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 67, 83 (2005); Swanberg & Logan, Domestic
Violence and Employment, supra note 15, at 6-8 (classifying job interference tactics as “actions
taken before work, actions taken during work, and actions taken after work,” all of which impacted
job performance).
22
Henry, supra note 21, at 83.
23
Tebo, supra note 2, at 42 (“[A]busers often retain control over victims by forcing them
to be economically dependent.”); see also Press Release, Senator Patty Murray, Murray Holds
Hearing and Introduces Bill on Domestic Violence in the Workplace (Apr. 17, 2007) (on file with
author) (“[E]conomic security and independence is the most accurate indicator of whether a victim
will be able to stay away from an abuser.”).
24
Campbell & Karin, supra note 2, at 7.
25
There is much less scholarship discussing the effect of violence on employers. See,
e.g., Deborah A. Widiss, Domestic Violence and the Workplace: An Analysis of Emerging State
Legislation, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 2 n.3, on file with author)
(noting the relative absence of scholarship in this field and describing the articles that do exist).
Those articles that do exist spend a significant time laying out an employer’s potential legal liability.
Surprisingly few talk about what should be done about the problem.
26
See generally AMY FARMER & JILL TIEFENTHALER, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND ITS
IMPACT ON WOMEN’S ECONOMIC STATUS, EMPLOYERS, AND THE WORKPLACE, available at
http://www.caepv.org/getinfo/docdetail.php?docID=259&catID=1 (last visited Oct. 29, 2008)
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Disease Control, almost eight million days of paid work (the equivalent
of 32,114 full-time jobs) are lost as a result of domestic violence every
year.27 Lost productivity alone has been calculated to cost employers
between three and five billion dollars every year.28 This does not include
the administrative difficulties and costs of covering people who take
unplanned time off and training replacement workers,29 property damage,
increased medical costs and insurance premiums for employers,30 or
public relation problems that result when an incident of violence gets in
the news.31
In addition, employers experience lost productivity and other
costs as a result of employing a perpetrator of domestic violence.
According to Laura A. Fortman, Head of the Maine Department of
Labor, a recent survey of perpetrators found that 78% regularly used
their employer’s resources to further their crime;32 85% contacted their
victim from work;33 48% had trouble focusing on work;34 42% were late
(evaluating the studies demonstrating the impact of domestic violence on employers and the
workplace).
27
CDC, supra note 1, at 19. The CDC has calculated the value of this lost employment
productivity to be $727.8 million. Id. at 31.
28
Press Release, Senator Patty Murray, Murray Introduces “SAFE Act” to Help
Domestic Violence Victims (Sept. 29, 2005); see also Security and Financial Empowerment (SAFE)
Act, H.R. 2395, 110th Cong. § 2(3) (2007) (citing this Bureau of National Affairs’ estimate and
further noting that “other reports have estimated the cost at between [$5.8 and $13 million]
annually”).
29
Too Much, Too Long? Domestic Violence in the Workplace: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Employment and Workplace Safety of the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and
Pensions, 110th Cong. 5 (2007) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of Kathy Rodgers,
President, Legal Momentum) (“Losing loyal and experienced employees generates substantial hiring
and training costs, which would be largely avoided by addressing the impact of domestic and sexual
violence in the workplace.”); Swanberg et al., supra note 1, at 299-300.
30
H.R. 2395, § 2(4) (notes an estimate of $31 billion per year for medical costs related to
domestic violence; with each incident ranging from $387 to $948). Employers absorb “nearly $4.1
billion . . . [in] direct medical and mental health care services.” CDC, supra note 1, at 2; see also 150
CONG. REC. S3152 (2004) (statement of Sen. Patty Murray) (“Businesses are paying $3 billion to $5
billion a year in health care for victims of domestic violence.”).
31
Kyle Riley, Employer TROs Are All the Rage: A New Approach to Workplace
Violence, 4 NEV. L.J. 1, 3 (2003) (“[N]egative publicity drives customers away, valued employees
leave the company and new hires are harder to attract.”) (internal quotations omitted); Swanberg et
al., supra note 1, at 301 (noting the stigma attached to workplace violence that impacts employer
decisions).
32
Senate Hearing, supra note 29, at 4 (statement of Laura A. Fortman, Commissioner,
Maine Department of Labor) (citing ELLEN RIDLEY, MAINE DEP’T OF LABOR & FAMILY CRISIS
SERVS., IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDERS ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH: A
PILOT STUDY 1 (2004), available at http://www.maine.gov/labor/labor_stats/publications/dvreports/
domesticoffendersreport.pdf); see also Legal Momentum, Domestic Violence and Economic
Insecurity (Jul. 14, 2005), http://www.stopfamilyviolence.org/ocean/host.php?folder=52;
EMPLOYERS AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, HOW DOES DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AFFECT THE
WORKPLACE?, http://www.employersagainstdomesticviolence.org/effects.html (last visited Nov. 22,
2007) (“[Perpetrators] use workplace resources . . . to express remorse or anger to, check up on, or
threaten the victim.”); H.R. 2395, § 2(17) (same).
33
Senate Hearing, supra note 29, at 4 (statement of Laura A. Fortman, Commissioner,
Maine Department of Labor) (further noting that 75% used the company phone).
34
This problem is called presenteeism. It is defined as “lost productivity that occurs
when employees come to work but perform below par due to any kind of illness.” JODIE LEVINEPSTEIN, CTR. FOR LAW & SOCIAL POLICY, PRESENTEEISM AND PAID SICK DAYS (Feb. 28, 2005),
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to work;35 and nearly one in five had or almost had an accident at work.36
Thus, employed perpetrators cause their employers to suffer economic
repercussions as a result of their crimes.
These economic costs are only one part of the challenge,
however.37 In addition to lost economic costs, employers are increasingly
faced with lawsuits seeking to impose liability on employers that fail to
adopt and/or enforce appropriate violence prevention policies or
otherwise hold employers responsible for actions a company took or
failed to take in response to domestic violence at work.
Injured employees, customers, perpetrators, and the government
have obtained relief and imposed liability on employers based on: (1)
federal and state statutes, and (2) judicially-imposed requirements from
common law.38 Cases have been brought under a variety of federal and
state laws including the Americans with Disabilities Act,39 the Family
and Medical Leave Act,40 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.41
http://www.clasp.org/publications/presenteeism.pdf. “Presenteeism results in lost productivity that
could be recovered.” Id.
35
RIDLEY, supra note 32; Legal Momentum, supra note 32.
36
Senate Hearing, supra note 29, at 5 (statement of Laura A. Fortman, Commissioner,
Maine Department of Labor); see also Widiss, supra note 25, manuscript at 9 (describing other
studies that show “perpetrators of domestic violence place significant costs on their own
employers”).
37
There is also an argument to be made that businesses need to care about domestic
violence to be good corporate citizens. “Corporate citizenship is [defined as] the business strategy
that shapes the values underpinning a company’s mission and the choices made each day by its
executives, managers and employees as they engage with society.” Boston College Center for
Corporate Citizenship, What is Corporate Citizenship, available at http://www.bcccc.net/index.cfm?page
Id=2007 (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). A good corporate social responsibility policy (“CSR”) could
address the impact of domestic violence on a variety of company stakeholders, which in turn can
help with retention, morale, risk management and any number of other positive associations. See,
e.g., Boston College Center for Corporate Citizenship, Company Example: Allstate (Feb. 2007),
available at http://www.bcccc.net/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewPage&pageID=1583&nodeID=1;
Allstate Foundation, Responsibility at Allstate, available at http://www.allstate.com/socialresponsibility/responsibility/main.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2009) (describing Allstate Foundation’s
domestic violence program as an example CSR signature program, and including the following
targeted stakeholders: “customers, associates[,] shareholders and communities at large”).
38
See Porter, supra note 6, at 289-319 (describing potential liability for terminating the
victim-employee and/or failing to protect other employees or persons on business property); Phillip
B. Russell, Workplace Violence: What Can Employers Do?, THE ACSNET Q. (2007),
http://www.ascnetquarterly.org/NewArticle.asp?id=185 (noting an employer’s duty to maintain a
safe workplace and the potential theories of liability).
39
Domestic violence may cause an impairment that “substantially limits one or more . . .
major life activities,” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000), such that the victim employee qualifies as
someone with a disability for which an employer may have an obligation to provide a “reasonable
accommodation[]” unless doing so would be an “undue hardship” for the employer. 42 U.S.C. §
12112(b)(5) (2000). One such accommodation may include leave or changing an employee’s work
location or hours. The failure to provide this accommodation could serve as the basis for a lawsuit.
But see Pettis v. House of Ruth Md., Inc., 144 Fed. Appx. 313, 316-17 (4th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff did
not have a disability under the ADA; her month long illness related to a sexual assault and
medications taken after the assault was temporary); Nina W. Tarr, Employment and Economic
Security For Victims of Domestic Abuse, 16 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 371, 392 (2007) (“There
have been no reported cases of a victim . . . successfully arguing that she had a disability . . . solely
because of her status as a victim of domestic violence.”).
40
The FMLA provides employees with up to twelve weeks of unpaid, job-protected time
off to care for one’s own serious health condition or the serious health condition of a covered family
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But state law has clearly been the leader in this arena. In addition
to state laws that may be more protective than their equivalent federal
laws, the most frequent claims are state tort law claims.42 The most
common tort claim is wrongful termination. Usually in these cases, an
employer decides to fire a victim employee. This may be because the
employee has missed work to ensure her safety from a feared attack or
because the employer fears that the employee’s presence at the
workplace will bring violence to the worksite.43
The general rule is that employers in every state except Montana
may fire an employee for any or no reason under the at-will employment
doctrine unless otherwise barred by law.44 This means that an employer
may legally fire someone who is late to or absent from work to deal with
domestic violence unless an exception to the at-will rule exists. Two
exceptions may apply in this situation. The first comes in the form of an
anti-discrimination law that prohibits termination on the basis of a
protected class.45 The second stems from case law that has expanded
exceptions to the at-will employment rule to allow a fired victimized
employee to bring a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public
policy. At least twenty-five states have cases finding an employer liable
for firing an employee as a result of “factors arising out of domestic
violence.”46
One such case is Apessos v. Memorial Press Group.47 In 2002,
the Massachusetts Superior Court ruled in favor of a newspaper reporter
member. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006). Domestic violence may result in a serious health condition
for an employee or a covered family member such that employers may be required to provide the
employee with time off under the FMLA. The failure to provide this leave may serve as the basis for
a lawsuit. See, e.g., Municipality of Anchorage v. Gregg, 101 P.3d 181 (Alaska 2004).
41
Potential claims under Title VII include disparate treatment, disparate impact, hostile
work environment, and retaliation. See, e.g., Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1995)
(female police officer harassed by ex-boyfriend who was also a cop brought successful hostile work
environment claim under Title VII against the City of Oakland).
42
Claims also may be brought under state workers compensation laws. These laws make
employers responsible for all injuries that arise out of one’s employment and may cover acts of
violence that occur at work. Usually the state workers compensation law provides the exclusive
remedy for injuries that occur at work. However, an injury that is intentionally caused may serve as
the basis for other claims. See, e.g., Gantt v. Security, USA, 356 F.3d 547, 563-64 (4th Cir. 2004).
43
Widiss, supra note 25, manuscript at 4 (noting the alternative where employees quit
out of fear of disclosing the violence).
44
PETER O. HUGHES, 10-259 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 259.02 (Release 130,
2008) (explaining the general principle and history of at-will employment); Wrongful Discharge
from Employment Act, MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 915 (eliminating the presumption of atwill employment and requiring “good cause” to terminate an employee after a probationary period).
45
As noted above, a few cases have brought claims under Title VII, but some
jurisdictions provide actual or perceived victims of domestic violence protection as a protected class
under the local anti-discrimination law such that an employer’s decision to fire a victim employee
who is a member of this protected class may be challenged in court or administrative action pursuant
to statute. See infra Section II (discussing some of the laws that may serve as the basis for a statutory
exception to the at-will doctrine).
46
Tebo, supra note 2, at 44. Factors such as court appearances, medical appointments,
and counseling sessions contribute to the absences that may lead to an employee’s termination. Id.
(citing Stacey P. Dougan, member, ABA Domestic Violence Commission).
47
15 Mass. L. Rptr. 322, 2002 WL 31324115 (Mass. Super. 2002).
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who obtained a temporary protection order over a weekend against her
husband who had assaulted her. Because the order was temporary,
Apessos had to appear in court on Monday to apply for an extension. She
left a message for her employer over the weekend informing her
supervisor of the Monday court appearance. On Monday, when she was
still dealing with tasks associated with ensuring her safety, she called her
supervisor in the afternoon to report that she would not be in that day but
would be back at work the next morning. When she reported to work the
next morning, she was fired. In denying the employer’s motion to
dismiss, the Court held that, even though she was an at-will employee,
Apessos could have a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy because she missed work to seek a protection order. In so holding,
the court declared that “[a] victim should not have to seek physical safety
at the cost of her employment.”48
The next most frequent fact pattern occurs when employers fail
to provide a safe workplace by failing to adequately respond to or
prevent violence. Negligence claims are the most common in this fact
pattern, although the type of negligence claim that is brought varies.49
48

Id. at *3. The case ultimately settled out of court but demonstrates the potential for
plaintiffs to use this theory to obtain relief for an employer’s response to the effects of violence at
work. See also Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Servs. Inc., 193 P.3d 128, 130 (Wash. 2008) (state has “a
clear [public policy] mandate . . . of protecting domestic violence survivors and their families and
holding their abusers accountable[,]” which may be the basis for the narrow wrongful termination
tort); Dunwoody v. Handskill Corp., 60 P.3d 1135 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (employee could sue for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy when she was fired after she missed work to testify
in a criminal proceeding pursuant to subpoena); Vance v. Dispatch Mgmt. Serv., 122 F. Supp. 2d
910 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (employee who was fired after she sought a protection order against her
supervisor who was a former boyfriend and battered her at work may continue on the claim for
retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy). But see Imes v. City of Asheville, 594 S.E.2d 397
(N.C. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 606 S.E.2d 117 (N.C. 2004) (No wrongful discharge claim exists when
an at-will employee cannot specify the precise public policy violated. The state legislature “is free”
to treat victims of domestic violence as a protected class, however, a general notion that the law
protects victims of domestic violence is not enough to create a public policy exemption “where none
exist[s].”).
Other courts have held in favor of a fired employee in wrongful termination against
public policy cases involving a different type of workplace violence. See, e.g., Daoust v. Abbott
Labs., No. 05 C 6018, 2007 WL 118414 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2007) (allowing Daoust’s claim for
wrongful termination in violation of public policy based on his belief that he was fired in response to
complaining about a subordinate employee’s abusive behavior). The Daoust court held that
“[a]llowing employers to discharge their employees because they reported an incident of workplace
violence would directly contravene Illinois’ efforts at promoting and protecting violence-free work
environments, to the detriment of Illinois’ working citizenry.” Id. at *4; see also Franklin v.
Monadnock Co., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 692 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). In Franklin, an employee was fired after
he reported allegations that a coworker threatened to have him and three other employees killed. The
employer did nothing in response to the reported threat. The coworker later stabbed him with a
screwdriver, and the employee was fired after he reported the assault to police. Id. at 694. The court
held that a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy may be based on an
employer’s action in violation of policies encouraging the reporting of workplace violence threats
and requiring employers to “take reasonable steps to address credible threats of violence in the
workplace.” Id. at 696-700. Plaintiffs’ could rely on these cases to analogize to a situation involving
domestic violence.
49
See, e.g., Panpat v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 71 P.3d 553, 554 (Or. Ct.
App. 2003) (holding that a negligence claim may proceed to the jury). The court held that it was
improper to grant summary judgment to the employer on the issue of whether it was foreseeable that
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Some examples include: wrongful death; negligent hiring if an employer
fails to investigate an applicant’s character and criminal history before
hiring; negligent supervision if an employer fails to train or supervise an
employee that perpetrates domestic violence against a coworker or third
party; negligent retention if an employer knows of an employee’s
propensity for violence and fails to fire the employee who later commits
an act of violence at work; and defamation.50 The average out-of-court
settlement for a failure to foresee or adequately respond to violence case
is about $500,000.51 In 2001, the average jury award was $3 million,52
and at least one reached $7.9 million.53
When you add an employer’s duty under section 5(a)(1) of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSH Act”), which requires
employers54 to “furnish to each of his employees employment and a place
of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing
or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees,”55
Panpat would be at risk of harm when the employer allowed another employee with whom she had
recently broken off a relationship and “who was on a psychiatric medical leave [as a result of the
break-up,] and who was not authorized to be in the workplace to approach” her. Id. at 558. But see
Midgette v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 550 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (Wal-Mart not liable on
negligence claims for failing to protect or negligent entrustment). In Midgette, Wal-Mart was not
found liable even though it had knowledge that the employee’s husband of 26 years was barred from
coming near her and that he was stopping by the store, it sold him ammunition for a 22-caliber
firearm on the evening the employee was shot, and it told the employee to “keep [her marital
difficulties] out of the store.” Id. at 560.
Intentional tort claims have also been brought against employers. See, e.g., Gantt v.
Security, USA, 356 F.3d 547 (4th Cir. 2004) (lower court erred in granting the employer summary
judgment on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim after an ex-boyfriend kidnapped her
from work, assaulted, and raped her). In Gantt, the employee’s supervisor assigned her to work at an
unsecured location with the intent of letting her ex-boyfriend approach her, despite knowledge that
the employee had a protection order against her ex-boyfriend—someone with whom the supervisor
“had a friendly relationship” and worked with in a “weapon qualified” position at another security
company. Id. at 549, 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).
50
See Campbell & Karin, supra note 2 (providing a detailed discussion of these potential
tort theories).
51
Id. at 6; Nat’l Ctr. for Victims of Crime, Workplace Violence: Employer Information,
available at http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&DocumentAction=View
Properties&DocumentID=32374&UrlToReturn=http%3a%2f%2fwww.ncvc.org%2fncvc%2fmain.as
px%3fdbName%3dAdvancedSearch (last visited Sept. 28, 2008) (referencing a National Safe
Workplace Institute estimate that a single episode of violence at work costs employers an average of
$250,000 in lost time and potential legal costs/liability).
52
Campbell & Karin, supra note 2, at 6.
53
Preventing Violence in the Workplace, LAB. & EMP. NEWSL. (Semmes, Attorneys at
Law, Balt., Md.), 2003, available at http://www.semmes.com/publications_archive/labor_employment/
preventing-violence-in-the-workplace.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 2008) (describing a $7.9 million
verdict in a negligence case for an employer’s failure to protect employees against a violence-prone
coworker); see also Burke, supra note 3 (observing that “juries tend to be generous with their
awards” when it comes to workplace violence); Chelsea Lettieri et al., Sloan Work & Fam. Res.
Network, Supporting Workers Experiencing Domestic Violence, 2007 POL’Y LEADERSHIP SERIES:
WORK-FAM. INFO. FOR ST. LEGISLATORS (Sloan Work & Fam. Res. Network, Chestnut Hill, Mass.),
2007, available at http://wfnetwork.bc.edu/pdfs/policy_makers11.pdf (stating that the price-tag for a
wrongful death case has risen to upwards of $850,000).
54
All private employers are subject to the OSH Act. 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (2000).
55
29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1). Section 5(a)(1) of the OSH Act is known as the general duty
clause. Employers may violate the general duty clause if they fail to adequately address credible
threats to an employee’s safety or if they allow an abuser to use work to perpetrate or further a
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into the mix, employers have conflicting obligations with no clear
instructions on what to do to maintain a safe workplace or limit or
eliminate their potential liability. Employers have to balance the privacy,
safety, and health interests of the victim employee with the rights of all
employees to a safe environment.56 In essence, employers are faced with
a Hobbsian choice in deciding how to deal with the impact of domestic
violence at work: face liability for failing to provide a safe workplace or
face liability for wrongful termination. This “catch-22” requires
employers “to look down the line and say, ‘If I don’t do this, which legal
case would I rather be defending.’”57 The question is not if an employer
will be sued; the question is under which theory that suit will come. This
threat of litigation is a real concern for employers.58
C.

Structural Problems with the “Normal” Workplace Set-up

The structure of the “normal” American workplace presents
additional obstacles to crafting a cultural response geared towards
mitigating the effects of domestic violence at work. The National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”)—the only
federal agency required to research techniques to prevent injuries at
work59—has studied these structural deficits. In 2006, NIOSH published
findings from the first government-sponsored national conference on
violence at work, entitled Partnering in Workplace Violence Prevention:
Translating Research to Practice. At the conference, participants

crime. However, while OSHA has issued guidance describing “best practices” and promoting the
voluntary development of “violence prevention programs,” the agency has stated that it will not
issue citations under the general duty clause for a failure to institute a “violence protection
program[].” Letter from Joseph A. Dear, Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of Labor, to Congressman Cass
Ballenger, Guidelines for Workplace Violence Prevention Programs for Night Retail Establishments
(Oct. 23, 1996), available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=
INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=22281. OSHA’s current position on workplace violence is available at
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/workplaceviolence/index.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2009).
56
Senate Hearing, supra note 29 (statement of Sue K. Willman, on behalf of the Society
for Human Resource Management (SHRM)) (articulating this concern); see also Tarr, supra note 39,
at 373 (noting the “almost inevitable tension between the employer’s desire to help and protect
employees who are victims of domestic violence and the need to respect employee autonomy creates
uncertainty for both victims of domestic violence and their employers”).
57
Workplace Violence: Interest in Violence Prevention Grows, but Few Companies
Have Established Plans, 37 OSHA Rep. (BNA) 403 (May 3, 2007) [hereinafter Workplace Violence]
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Mark Braverman and further quoting employment lawyer
Rebecca Speer, who commented that “[employers] have to be educated on countervailing rights—
employer obligations to provide a safe workplace but also respecting rights of privacy”).
58
See Mary J. Pitzer, Work & Careers Human Resources, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1997, at
5 (Employers fear lawsuits, and “[i]t’s not just the violence they fear. It’s the lawsuits as well.
[Because e]mployees have a legal right to a safe workplace . . . .”).
59
Nat’l Inst. for Occupational Safety & Health, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention,
Women’s Safety and Health Issues at Work, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/women/ (last visited
Sept. 28, 2008).
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discussed obstacles to successful workplace violence prevention.60 Gaps
identified at the conference include: (1) communication problems; (2) the
appropriate role for employers in preventing and responding to
workplace violence; and (3) “too few incentives for companies to
implement [a workplace violence] prevention program.”61 Other gaps that
hinder violence prevention include the inconsistent and sometimes
conflicting obligations under federal and state law described above.
There is not one universal communication problem that prevents
an effective response to workplace violence. Instead, there is an
amalgamation of problems involving communication. There may be a
breakdown in established communication systems when domestic
violence is involved.62 Supervisors and employees may experience a
“disconnect[]” that prevents fears, concerns, and effective collaboration
on this issue.63 There also may be a wall of silence that prevents
employees from informing the employer about a dangerous situation.
Employees may remain silent for any number of reasons.
Victims and witnesses of violence may not report threats or acts of
violence if they do not believe their employers will do anything with the
information or be willing to get involved in such a personal situation.64
Alternatively, employees might believe that mentioning it would be a
waste of company time and energy.65 Embarrassment and fear of
termination or other retribution often prevent victim employees from
talking to their employers about their situations.66 Some employees may
60
NAT’L INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, PUBL’N NO. 2006-144, WORKPLACE VIOLENCE PREVENTION STRATEGIES AND
RESEARCH NEEDS § 2 (2006) [hereinafter NIOSH], available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2006-144/
pdfs/2006-144.pdf.
61
Id. at §§ 2.1.1-2.1.4.
62
Id. at § 2.1.9 (“Lack of reporting is also a fundamental barrier to effective . . .
prevention.”).
63
Id. at § 2.1.3; see also Stephanie L. Perin, Employers May Have to Pay When
Domestic Violence Goes To Work, 18 REV. LITIG. 365, 396-98 (1999) (discussing how to train
supervisors and coworkers to identify domestic violence victims).
64
Conference participants noted that employers are wary against “assuming
responsibility for workers’ private lives.” NIOSH, supra note 60, § 2.1.1; see also Violence is Top
Security Concern in 2000, BRAUN CONSULTING NEWS (Braun Consulting Group, Seattle, Wash.),
Fall 2000, available at http://www.braunconsulting.com/bcg/newsletters/fall0005.html (“The
number one message that [e]mployers must get out to employees is: ‘It is OK to contact management
if any employee believes there is a reason to be concerned[.]’ . . . [Companies need to take control
over] exposure to violence by encouraging employees to tell management about their concerns.”);
Swanberg & Macke, supra note 15, at 399 (One reason victims do not disclose violence at work is
the “thought that [domestic violence] was a personal issue and should not be brought into the
workplace.”).
65
Employees may not report violence if they “feel that nothing will be done if they do
report.” NIOSH, supra note 60, § 2.1.9.
66
See Tebo, supra note 2, at 44; see also Jennifer Swanberg & T.K. Logan, Intimate
Partner Violence, Employment and the Workplaces: An Interdisciplinary Perspective, 22 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 263, 263-66 (2007); Ilann Margalit Maazel & O. Andrew F. Wilson,
Outside Counsel: Protecting the Rights of Domestic Violence Victims in the Workplace, N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 1, 2006, at 4 (explaining the evidence heard at four hearings of the New York City Council,
including “a growing body of evidence suggesting that domestic violence victims justifiably fear
negative employment actions such as demotion, suspension, loss of pay or benefits or termination”);
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think an employer has no ability to improve the situation, might make it
into a bigger deal than it is, or reject or discredit the employee’s
circumstances by taking the perpetrator’s side.67 Others may have
confidence in their ability to independently deal with the violence and its
effects.68 Further, employees that have obtained a protection order are
under no legal duty to inform an employer that they have obtained one or
that coworkers or customers may be endangered.69
Communication issues are particularly difficult for small
employers whose employees typically lack a voice in management
decisions.70 Of course, an employer may always create violence
prevention policies as well as educate and train supervisors and other
employees about domestic violence and how to deal with the effects it
has on work. But an employer cannot address a specific risk without
knowledge that the risk exists. Even companies with appropriate
workplace policies come across a problem when employees are not
aware of the policy’s existence or how to use it.71
In addition, the tools that exist for employers and employees
tend to be “incident-focused” reactive responses to domestic violence.72
For example, employees seek a remedy under tort law only after violence
occurs, which does nothing to help with prevention.73 And the
“prevailing corporate attitude” is one that denies the need for employers
to address domestic violence “until a tragic, violent event occurs.”74

Abby Ellin, Agony of Domestic Violence at the Office, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2000, at G1 (describing
one victim’s fear to inform her boss).
67
See Richard D. Sem, Workplace Violence: Prevention and Response, SEC. TECH. &
DESIGN, Sept. 1, 2007, at 84, 88, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/medicine-health/diseasesdisorders-mental-illness/10587534-1.html (“It is especially dangerous, and all too common, for
supervisors and managers to brush off concerns that are raised to them or even to penalize the person
reporting.”); Swanberg & Macke, supra note 15, at 400 (noting that victims did not disclose violence
at work out a failure to trust their colleagues or employers).
68
Swanberg & Logan, Domestic Violence and Employment, supra note 15, at 12 (Some
“women mentioned that they could balance the demands of work with the victimization and
therefore deemed it ‘unnecessary to tell anyone at work, as [they] could handle the abuse on [their]
own.’”).
69
Many advocacy organizations recommend keeping a certified copy of the order at
hand and providing a copy of the order to anyone who needs to know about it, including employers.
See, e.g., IDAHO COUNCIL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & VICTIM ASSISTANCE, FILING PROTECTION
ORDERS, available at http://www2.state.id.us/crimevictim/victims/ProtectionOrders.cfm (last visited
Sept. 28, 2008); N. H. Coal. Against Domestic Violence & Sexual Violence, DV in the Workplace,
http://www.nhcadsv.org/dv_workplace.cfm (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
70
NIOSH, supra note 60, § 2.1.3; see also Perin, supra note 63, at 401 (“Despite the
growing number of businesses that have made domestic violence a company issue, many employers
remain unconvinced that domestic violence is a problem in the workplace.”).
71
Press Release, Corporate Alliance to End Partner Violence, supra note 5 (Two thirds
of surveyed employees “did not know if their employer has a domestic violence policy or program in
place.”).
72
Widiss, supra note 25, manuscript at 44 (“By approaching the situation from the
individual ‘business’ perspective or ‘victim’ perspective, many advocates and legislatures have
failed to recognize the benefits of addressing the issue more comprehensively.”).
73
Riley, supra note 31, at 25 (These are “post-incident remedies.”).
74
NIOSH, supra note 60, § 2.1.1.
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This approach is not working. The rules under which victims and
perpetrators operate and the conflicting obligations imposed on
employers have primarily been established on a state level (e.g., criminal
law, tort law, etc.).75 The time has come to change this normative
response to domestic violence to recognize the impact it has at work.
Society can no longer afford to view domestic violence as an issue to be
dealt with solely through the criminal or family law systems. Instead,
society has an obligation to create a coherent structure and system to
respond to the totality of the problem.
The remaining sections explain proposals to change the law to
address the problem of domestic violence in a more holistic fashion on a
national level. After reviewing recent changes to state law and existing
federal proposals, this Article argues that the best way to achieve
effective results is through a federal approach that recognizes and works
with the states to provide additional, appropriately tailored tools to all
workplace actors.
II.

NEW STATE LAWS RESPOND TO THE NEEDS OF EMPLOYEES

Before a comprehensive federal approach to combat the effects
of domestic violence at work can be developed, we need to examine the
systems already in place in the states and local jurisdictions. Looking at
what states have already done to shape their laws to respond to the
impact of domestic violence at the workplace gives a sense of the needs
that employees and employers have been experiencing as well as a basis
of practice on which to draw.
In recent years, states have been granting additional jobprotected time off and other employment-related protections to
employees in an effort to address the effects of violence at work. Three
relevant trends emerge from a review of the state laws. Employees have
been granted additional: (1) access to leave from work; (2) access to
unemployment compensation; and (3) protection from adverse
employment actions via anti-discrimination laws.
The first trend involves states creating new or expanding existing
leave mandates in an effort to support victims’ economic selfsufficiency.76 Under these mandates, employers are required to provide
access to some form of job-protected time off to be used in responding to
violence. According to a 2005 survey of state laws conducted by Legal
75

See, e.g., Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly:
Between “The Truly National and the Truly Local”, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1133-37, 1141 (2001)
(noting the need of state courts to “serve as the principal vehicle” and observing that criminal
remedies have been the primary “legal response to domestic violence”).
76
See Edward H. Trent & Richard N. Margulies, Employment Protections for Victims of
Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS. 38 (Nov. 2007) (“Because
for so many losing their jobs has been part and parcel of being a victim of domestic violence,
legislatures in an increasing number of states have enacted legislation to provide protected time off
from work, in addition to other protected leaves or paid leaves . . . .”).
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Momentum,77 thirty-two states grant crime victims some form of time off
to participate in court proceedings.78 Most of these leave laws are
narrowly defined and enumerate the specific activities for which leave
may be taken. For example, some require employers to provide leave
only if the employee is responding to a subpoena or in response to a
prosecutor’s request to serve as a witness in a criminal case.79 Others
allow leave for a much broader range of activities. Nine states provide
leave to victims of domestic violence to take actions to obtain a civil
protection order, receive medical treatment including psychological care,
relocate or obtain shelter or other safe housing, or participate in safety
planning.80 Two provide leave to seek protection orders only.81 Some
states require employees to use all other available leave before they may
take leave pursuant to the domestic violence work leave statute.82 These
laws also vary as to the length of leave for which job protection is
afforded.83 Most states provide for between three and thirty days.84 A few
permit leave for a “reasonable and necessary” length of time.85 Most of
these laws provide for unpaid leave.86
77
Legal Momentum is a leader in the effort to obtain additional protections, organize
support for, and analyze local, state, and national employment protections for victims of violence.
See Legal Momentum, About Us, http://www.legalmomentum.org/site/PageServer?pagename=aboutus_1
(last visited Nov. 3, 2008). For more information on Legal Momentum’s efforts to secure
employment rights for victims of domestic violence, see Legal Momentum, Employment and
Housing Rights for Victims of Domestic Violence, http://www.legalmomentum.org/site/PageServer?
pagename=erhdv_16 (last visited Nov. 3, 2008).
78
See LEGAL MOMENTUM, KNOW YOUR RIGHTS: TIME OFF TO PARTICIPATE IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 1 (2005), available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/site/DocServer/
criminal%20proceedings.pdf?docID=295. In addition, federal employees are granted paid leave to
serve as a witness in a case in which the government is a party. 5 U.S.C. §§ 5515, 5537, 6322
(2000).
79
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 1-612.03 (2001) (certain city employees have access to paid
leave to serve as a witness in a case in which the city is a party); ORE. REV. STAT. § 659A.190 (2007)
(granting certain employees the right to take unpaid leave to attend criminal proceedings). As
explained below, most protection orders are civil in nature and therefore, employees’ jobs are not
protected in these states if they seek protection orders during normal business hours, although five
states explicitly allow leave to go to court to request a civil protection order. See LEGAL
MOMENTUM, supra note 78, at 2.
80
LEGAL MOMENTUM, 50-STATE OVERVIEW: EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS FOR VICTIMS
OF DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 1 (2006), available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/assets/pdfs/
employment50stateoverview.pdf (listing nine state statutes that provide “Domestic violence-specific
leave laws [that] provide time off to victims to take a range of steps to address the violence . . . .”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
81
LEGAL MOMENTUM, supra note 78, at 2.
82
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-73 (2007) (employees “shall exhaust [any] other
paid and unpaid leave” before taking domestic violence leave).
83
Illinois’s Victims’ Economic Security and Safety Act (VESSA), which was modeled
on an earlier version of the federal SEES and SAFE Act, provides the most expansive protection: up
to twelve weeks of leave per year for victims or family members of victims to take time off from
work to seek medical care, counseling, services from victim’s groups, safety training, and/or legal
assistance. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/20(a) (West 2003).
84
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.7 (2007) (three days of leave is available
after all other leave is exhausted or waived by the employer).
85
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 850 (2007).
86
LEGAL MOMENTUM, supra note 78, at 2. But see D.C. CODE § 32-131.02(b) (2008)
(provides for paid time off to seek a protection order, counseling, or other legal and social services
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The second trend in state laws granting additional protection to
victimized employees involves the provision of unemployment benefits.
Usually unemployment compensation is available only to employees
who have been fired from their jobs.87 Most states deem employees
ineligible for benefits if they voluntarily left employment without “good
cause” or if they were discharged for “misconduct.”88 A growing trend
among state laws is to define “good cause” to include protection of one’s
self or children from domestic violence. “Good cause” provisions entitle
employees “to benefits if they quit [work] because their health, safety or
comfort has been endangered.”89 Currently, twenty-eight states and the
District of Columbia provide unemployment benefits to victims of
domestic violence; however, the extent of and circumstances under
which victims may obtain these benefits vary.90 No federal law requires
states to provide unemployment compensation to victims of domestic
violence at this time.

based on a sliding scale determined by the employer’s size); MILWAUKEE CODE OF ORDINANCES,
ch. 112 (2008) (providing for up to seventy-two hours of paid sick leave per year, or up to forty
hours of work if the business has less than ten employees, for an “[a]bsence necessary due to
domestic” violence); Mass. Exec. Order No. 491 § 8 (2007), available at http://www.mass.gov/Agov3/docs/Executive
%20Orders/executive_order_491.pdf (provides for up fifteen days of paid leave “for purposes of
victim counseling, obtaining medical treatment, attending legal proceedings, or carrying out other
necessary activities, where such activities result from domestic violence or stalking and the
employee is not the abuser, or where such activities result from sexual assault inflicted upon the
employee or upon the employee’s children where the employee is not the abuser”).
In addition, a number of states are currently considering paid leave bills that would
provide time off from work that would cover one or more circumstances under which an employee
may need time off to address the effects of violence. For example, California Assembly Bill 2716
would provide up to nine days of paid time off to recover from illness, care for another, or recover
from related to domestic violence or sexual assault. Legis. Assem. 2716, 2007-08 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2007-08). More information on state efforts to enact paid leave is available at Multi-State Working
Families Consortium, http://www.valuefamiliesatwork.org/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
87
See Katherine Elizabeth Ulrich, Insuring Family Risks: Suggestions for a National
Family Policy and Wage Replacement, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 33-34 (2002) (explaining that
state agencies use a three-part test to evaluate a claimant’s eligibility for unemployment
compensation: (1) has the claimant worked for a covered employer and demonstrated an attachment
to the labor force; (2) is the claimant able and available to work; and (3) was the claimant separated
from employment involuntarily); CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCHOOL, LEGAL INFO. INST., Unemployment
Compensation, in WEX, http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/unemployment_compensation (last visited
Nov. 1, 2008) (stating that unemployment compensation provides monetary payments for a period of
time if the worker has been terminated “through no fault of [his] own”).
88
See, e.g., Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, Unemployment Compensation
FAQ’s, http://jfs.ohio.gov/unemp_comp_faq/faq_elig_reason.stm#laid_off (last visited Nov. 1,
2008) (explaining that an employee must show “just cause” for leaving employment, while the
employer must show “just cause” for discharging the employee).
89
Campbell & Karin, supra note 2, at 7.
90
See LEGAL MOMENTUM, STATE LAW GUIDE: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS
1 (2007), available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/site/DocServer/ui.pdf?docID=574. For
example, California, Maine, and New Hampshire allow a victim to receive benefits only if she made
“all reasonable efforts to preserve the employment.” Connecticut applies the exception only to
someone who quit work to protect children living with the person. EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAWS, Good
Cause for Voluntary Leaving § 430.01, available at http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/
2001compeli.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
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The third trend relates to protecting victims under local antidiscrimination laws. Three jurisdictions—Illinois, New York City, and
Westchester County—specifically prohibit all forms of employment
discrimination against employees because they are or are perceived to be
victims of domestic violence.91 These jurisdictions also require
employers to provide victims with reasonable accommodations at work.
For example, a state court held that the New York Department of
Corrections failed to reasonably accommodate an employee who violated
her employer’s sick leave policy when she refused to give out the address
of the domestic violence shelter in which she was living to protect the
safety of the shelter’s other residents and employees. The court stated
that it would not be an undue burden for the employer to modify its sick
leave policy to permit domestic violence victims to live away from home
while on leave.92 In addition, other states prevent employers from taking
adverse employment actions against someone based on the fact that the
person sought or obtained a protection order,93 sought or obtained
counseling or safety planning,94 responded to a subpoena,95 or otherwise
participated in a criminal proceeding or police investigation.96
Taken together, these laws offer employees additional protection
and tools to deal with violence at work. Despite the promise of these
laws to address some aspects of the problem, they are not enough.
Victims in a couple of states do not have access to any of these
protections.97 In addition, few states offer all of these protections or
otherwise have a comprehensive approach to deal with violence at
work.98 Moreover, these state law trends, along with the tort cases
described above, demonstrate that employers are increasingly faced with
91

820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/30 (Supp. 2008) (providing that employees may not be
fired because they take leave related to an incident of domestic violence or because the workplace is
disrupted due to actual or threatened domestic violence); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (Supp. 2007);
WESTCHESTER COUNTY CODE § 700.03 (1999).
92
Reynolds v. Fraser, 781 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887-88, 891 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (finding it
was improper to fire an employee for violating the employer’s sick leave policy when she was not at
her “report[ed]” residence while on leave as a result of domestic violence).
93
See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 230(c) (West 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-85b (2002);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-28-10(a) (2002).
94
See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.1(a).
95
See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 595.209(1)(14) (West Supp. 2008) (providing that an
employee may not be discharged or disciplined for responding to a subpoena to prepare for or attend
a criminal proceeding; nor may an employee be required to use vacation, personal, or sick leave
when responding to a subpoena); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1550(A) (2003).
96
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-85b(a); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4957(a) (West
Supp. 2008).
97
For example, neither West Virginia nor Idaho have laws addressing employment
issues for victims of domestic violence. See LEGAL MOMENTUM, 50 STATE OVERVIEW:
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 2-3, available at
http://www.legalmomentum.org/assets/pdfs/employment50stateoverview.pdf (last visited Sept. 29,
2008).
98
Illinois and D.C. are two of the exceptions, offering some form of time off,
unemployment compensation, and nondiscrimination protections. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-45,
405/601 (Supp. 2008); D.C. CODE §§ 32-131.02(b)(4), 51-131-136 (2001).
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additional duties to respond to the impact of violence at work.99 And
these obligations may impose conflicting duties on employers.100 As a
result, the legal protections available to a victim differ depending on
where the victim lives. As a policy matter, therefore, the federal
government can and should piggy-back on this momentum building in
the states to address the needs of employees and do something to fix the
mismatch between what victim employees and employers need and what
recourse the law provides. The next section analyzes two bills from the
110th Congress that attempt to address this mismatch as well as
proposals to add additional provisions to them to more effectively
address the mismatch.
III.

THE CURRENT FEDERAL BILLS AND PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE
SEES AND SAFE ACT TO CREATE A SOCIETAL RESPONSE TO
VIOLENCE AT WORK

In 1994, Congress first helped educate and elevate the national
consciousness about the effects of domestic violence against women with
the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”).101 Federal law should now
build on the state laws described above and give employers and
employees their own defenses in the front-line to make domestic
99
This momentum also exists on the local level, where additional employment
protections for victims of domestic violence are also being gained. See Maazel & Wilson, supra note
66, at 4 (describing the 2001 amendment to the New York City Administrative Code, which became
the “forefront of a growing national legal trend protecting the rights of domestic violence victims at
work”).
100
See 153 CONG. REC. E2337-02 (2007) (statement of Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard)
(noting that although “many states . . . have taken action to help survivors retain their financial
independence, the job protections offered by state laws vary dramatically”); Senate Hearing, supra
note 29 (statement of Kathy Rogers, President of Legal Momentum) (“[E]xisting state laws have
created an uneven patchwork of protection, where a victim’s access to the economic security she
needs to separate from an abuser depends on the state in which she happens to live.”).
101
The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat.
1796. This law—the first comprehensive federal legislation to address violence—prompted changes
in public attitudes, policy, law, and the criminal justice system affecting federal, state, and local
responses to domestic violence against women and children. See generally KRISTEN J. ROE,
NATIONAL ALLIANCE TO END SEXUAL VIOLENCE, THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT AND ITS
IMPACT ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE PUBLIC POLICY: LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD (Sept.
2004), http://www.nrcdv.org/docs/Mailings/2004/NRCDVNovVAWA.pdf (providing a history of
VAWA and its impact, as well as an analysis of concerns and gaps that remain a decade after its
enactment). VAWA also provided the first federal program to prosecute interstate domestic violence
and sexual assault crimes, enforce protection orders across state lines, and highlight the unique needs
of certain underserved populations, such as battered immigrants. National Coalition Against
Domestic Violence, Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) Appropriations, http://www.ncadv.org/
files/2008vawa.pdf.
The original provisions of VAWA expired in 2000. The law was subsequently
reauthorized in 2000 and 2005 to provide resources and protections to additional communities
impacted by domestic violence. See id.; Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000); Pub. Law 109162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2005). VAWA 2000 and VAWA 2005 appropriated funding to expand legal
assistance, and programs to address prevention, housing, health care, child custody and visitation,
and employment issues resulting from domestic violence. Id.; see also GARRINE P. LANEY,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT:
HISTORY AND FEDERAL FUNDING (2005), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL30871_20050318.pdf.
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violence a “public” issue once and for all. Federal legislation is the
appropriate level at which to address this societal problem. In so doing,
federal law would set a national standard to address a national problem.
On April 17, 2007, Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) introduced the
Survivors’ Empowerment and Economic Security Act (“SEES Act”).102
The Security and Financial Empowerment Act (“SAFE Act”),103 a
companion bill to the SEES Act, was introduced by Congresswoman
Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA) on May 21, 2007.104 These bills do a lot to
respond to the needs of employees dealing with domestic violence by:
(1) providing up to thirty days of unpaid job protected leave per year to
deal with the aftermath of domestic violence;105 (2) adding victims of
domestic violence as a protected class against which adverse
employment actions may not be based unless it would present an undue
hardship to the employer;106 and (3) amending the Internal Revenue Code
to require every state to allow victims to access unemployment benefits
if they are fired or forced to leave their job as a result of domestic
violence.107

102
S.1136, 110th Cong. (2007). As of September 12, 2008, the SEES Act had three
cosponsors: Sherrod Brown (D-OH); Christopher Dodd (D-CT); and Thomas Harkin (D-IA) and has
been referred to the Senate Finance Committee. Govtrack.us, S.1136: Survivors’ Empowerment and
Economic Security Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-1136 (last visited Nov.
21, 2008).
The employment related provisions of these bills have been introduced in one form or
another since the 104th Congress, including: SAFE Act, S. 1796, 109th Cong. (2005); SAFE Act,
H.R. 3185, 109th Cong. (2005); VAWA Reauthorization Act of 2005, H.R. 3171, 109th Cong.
(2005); Title VII Providing Economic Security for Victims of Violence, VAWA Reauthorization
Act of 2005, S. 1197, 109th Cong. § 701 (2005); SAFE Act, S. 1801, 108th Cong. (2003); SAFE
Act, H.R. 3420, 108th Cong. (2003); Victims’ Economic Security and Safety Act (VESSA), S. 1249,
107th Cong. (2001); VESSA, H.R. 2670, 107th Cong. (2001); Battered Women’s Employment
Protection Act, H.R. 5262, 106th Cong. (2000); Title II, Violence Against Women and the
Workplace of the Battered Women’s Economic Security and Safety Act, S. 1069, 106th Cong.
(1999); Title II, Violence Against Women and the Workplace of the Battered Women’s Economic
Security Act, S. 2558, 105th Cong. (1998); Title VII, Violence Against Women and the Workplace
of the Violence Against Women Act of 1998, H.R. 3514, 105th Cong. (1998); Battered Women’s
Employment Protection Act, S. 367, 105th Cong. (1997); Battered Women’s Employment Protection
Act, H.R. 851, 105th Cong. (1997); and Battered Women’s Employment Protection Act, H.R. 3837,
104th Cong. (1996).
103
H.R. 2395, 110th Cong. (2007). As of July 9, 2008, the SAFE Act had bipartisan
support from the following co-sponsors: Thomas Allen (D-ME); Brian Baird (D-WA); Shelley
Berkley (D-NV); Andre Carson (D-IN); Bob Filner (D-CA); Michael Honda (D-CA); William
Jefferson (D-LA); Zoe Lofgren (D-CA); Nita Lowey (D-NY); Thaddeus McCotter (R-MI); James
McDermott (D-WA); George Miller (D-CA); Dennis Moore (D-KS); James Moran (D-VA); Ted
Poe (R-TX); Hilda Solis (D-CA); and Albert Wynn (D-MD). Govtrack.us, H.R. 2395: Security and
Financial Empowerment (SAFE) Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-2395
(last visited Nov. 3, 2008).
104
The remainder of the Article includes citations to the SAFE Act only, but each of these
citations to the SAFE Act has corollary provisions in the SEES Act. Other than the title provision,
the House and Senate bills are identical.
105
H.R. 2395 § 102(a).
106
Id. § 303.
107
Id. § 202(a). The SAFE Act also contains the Victims of Abuse Insurance Protection
Act, which would prevent the denial or restriction of insurance coverage based on the status of an
applicant or an insured person as a victim of domestic violence. Id. §§ 401-409.
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The Employment and Workplace Safety Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions convened a
hearing to discuss these bills on the same day the SEES Act was
introduced. At the hearing, Kathy Rogers, President of Legal
Momentum, testified that “federal legislation is needed to ensure all
survivors of sexual and domestic violence receive at least basic economic
protections.”108 This is a critical point. And these provisions would have a
significant impact on the immediate and long-term safety, economic
security, and lives of victims of violence.
But Senator Isakson (R-GA) also made a key point at the hearing
when he pointed out that “[t]he presumptive basis of legislation is
critical,” and these bills presume that employers are at fault for failing to
protect victims.109 This frame underlies the provisions of the proposed
legislation, especially when viewed in the context of the historical
opposition businesses have against additional leave mandates. Federal
legislation can be crafted in a way that recognizes, respects, and
integrates the roles and needs of a variety of stakeholders. In this context,
the bills also need to ensure that employers are offered avenues and
incentives to address the impact of domestic violence or proactively
maintain a safe worksite.
The remainder of this section offers amendments to the SEES
and SAFE Act bills to holistically approach the theory and practice of
how domestic violence affects the workplace. Before describing these
proposals, however, it is worth noting that there are a number of other
bills pending in the 110th Congress that attempt to address one or more
of the problems associated with domestic violence at work.110 The
108

Senate Hearing, supra note 29, at 5 (statement of Kathy Rogers, President, Legal

Momentum).
109
Id. How the bills are framed has important political ramifications. See Widiss, supra
note 25, manuscript at 29 (correctly noting that framing domestic violence protections in the
antidiscrimination context “predisposes businesses to oppose it”).
110
Other bills have been introduced during this Congress to specifically deal with
domestic violence. For example, Congresswoman Roybal-Allard (D-CA) and Congressman Ted Poe
(R-TX) introduced: (1) the Job Protection for Survivors Act, H.R. 4015, 110th Cong. (2007), which
would provide up to fifteen days of time off to employees to deal with the aftermath of violence,
“such leave as is necessary” to participate in civil or criminal proceedings related to domestic
violence, and protection against adverse employment actions on the basis of one’s actual or
perceived status as a victim of violence subject to an undue burden defense for the employer; (2) the
Unemployment Insurance for Survivors Act of 2007, H.R. 4016, 110th Cong. (2007), which would
require states to provide unemployment compensation to people whose work is terminated because
of domestic violence; and (3) the Insurance Non-Discrimination for Survivors Act, H.R. 4014, 110th
Cong. (2007), which would prohibit employers and insurance providers from basing coverage
decisions on an employee’s history as an abuse victim. In addition, Title III, the Employment
Protection for Battered Women of The Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act, would allow
employees to take FMLA-protected leave if needed to address problems arising from domestic
violence. H.R. 1369, 110th Cong. (2007). The Healthy Families Act, S. 910, 110th Cong. (2007),
H.R. 1542, 110th Cong. (2007), would also grant victims access to up to seven days of paid sick
leave annually that could be used to address the effects of domestic violence. Section 9 of the
Healthy Families Act would also require the GAO to study the annual use of paid sick leave,
including “[w]hether employees used paid sick leave to care for illnesses or conditions caused by
domestic violence against the employees or their family members.” H.R. 1542, 110th Cong. (2007).
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fundamental premise underlying the analysis in this Article, as well as
the proposals that follow, can be applied to any one of the pending bills
that becomes the moving vehicle with the most promise to offer a
comprehensive societal response to the problem of violence at work.
This Article posits that the employee protections found in the current
bills combined with the following proposals to change the SEES and
SAFE Act would give both employees and employers a reason to want to
be a part of the solution and work to actually move these bills toward
passage and effectuating change.
A.

Reframing the Bills to Acknowledge a Societal Problem

The first proposal is to reframe these bills to specifically state
that appropriately responding to and combating domestic violence at
work is a societal issue. Currently, the purpose section of the bills
acknowledges that the goal is “to minimize the negative impact on
interstate commerce from dislocations of employees and harmful effects
on productivity, employment, health care costs, and employer costs.”111 It
continues by noting that this goal should be accomplished by “(A)
entitling employed victims . . . to take leave . . . without penalty from
their employers; and (B) prohibiting employers from discriminating
against actual or perceived victims . . . in a manner that accommodates
the legitimate interests of employers and protects the safety of all persons
in the workplace.”112
Specific purpose statements should be added to reflect the need
for a social response to the problem of domestic violence at work in a
way that recognizes the impact on, role of, and responsibility of the
business community. One way to do this would be to add the following
subsections to § 101(7): (C) providing employers with an affirmative tool
by which they can seek and take preventive action to protect the safety of
all persons in the workplace; and (D) creating a societal response to
address the effects of domestic violence at work.
This section—and, therefore, the purpose of the legislation—
should be about more than just accommodating employers’ legitimate
interests as a defense to a discrimination claim. It should also be about
more than simply summarily noting that domestic violence imposes costs
on employers as part of a laundry list of purposes (especially if the
substantive provisions outlined elsewhere in the bills do not necessarily
correlate with this stated purpose). Instead, this section should recognize
that domestic violence affects everyone—including employers. Making
this change would broaden the conversation on this issue beyond the
Finally, the Unemployment Insurance Modernization Act, S. 1871, 110th Cong. (2007) would,
among other things, provide states with incentives to extend eligibility for unemployment insurance
to individuals who leave work as a result of domestic violence.
111
H.R. 2395 § 101 (emphasis added).
112
Id. (emphasis added).
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current focus on expanding protections for victims, but it would not
remove those expansions from the discussion.
Specifically articulating the purpose of the bills in this frame is
key. It would reflect an express congressional intent to holistically
address this problem. And, when combined with the additional proposals
described below, it would be a clear statement recognizing the impact of
domestic violence on the workplace as well as a congressional desire to
provide additional ways for employees, employers, and society as a
whole to mitigate that impact.
B.

Giving Employers the Ability to Go to Court to Obtain
Protection Orders

This proposal would create a new title to the SEES and SAFE
Act that would encourage states to give employers the ability to obtain
protection orders in response to actual or threatened violence directed at
an employee. It would also preempt state and local laws that fail to
provide employers with this important tool or fail to provide a litigation
defense for the employer against state tort claims brought by victim
employees, coworkers, or third parties.
Every state has a statute that authorizes a court to issue
protection orders for the protection and safety of one or more parties.113
The statutes vary in detail about who may seek a protection order,114 how
long an order may last, what activities may be proscribed in the
protection order, and other relief that may be sought.115 Most statutes
provide the flexibility to afford protection and instruct another not to
abuse, harass, or contact the petitioner (and sometimes other people) at
work, home, or other frequently visited locations.116 Almost every state
grants courts the authority to award temporary custody and visitation if
children are involved117 and to require perpetrators to relinquish all
firearms.118
113
The majority of these statutes were enacted between 1976 and 1994. Carolyn N. Ko,
Note, Civil Restraining Orders for Domestic Violence: The Unresolved Question of “Efficacy,” 11
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 361, 362 (2002).
114
A protection order (sometimes known as a restraining order, a no contact order, a civil
protection order, or a civil restraining order) is a court order requiring someone to do or not to do
specified acts for the protection of the petitioner, who is typically a victim of domestic violence.
115
See Ko, supra note 113, at 364-67 (analyzing the legal framework and procedures
related to obtaining protection orders in the various states); id. at 363 & n.22 (Protection orders may
offer a Petitioner a broad range of relief, including “eviction [of the perpetrator] from the shared
residence, child support payments, limitations on child visitation rights, and mandatory counseling
attendance.”).
116
Brief for the Family Violence Prevention Fund et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Castle-Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No. 04-278), at 8-9 [hereinafter
Gonzales Amicus Brief] (“The relief available through state protection order statutes is as varied as
are the safety needs of abused women and their children.”).
117
Id. at 16.
118
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.8(j)(1) (West Supp. 2008).
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States issue two kinds of protection orders: (1) a temporary
order, which usually can be issued without a hearing and lasts for no
more than a few weeks; and (2) a permanent protection order that usually
lasts for up to a year (or longer).119 A protection order is enforceable
everywhere in the United States pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit
provisions of VAWA.120
1. State Employer Protection Order Laws
In theory, employers may seek a temporary restraining order
through a tort action in almost every state. However, these actions are
burdensome, expensive, last for a relatively short period of time, and are
difficult to obtain.121 Consequently, employers have sought a quicker,
less-expensive way to obtain a protection order from a court. Although it
has yet to be proposed on the federal level, the business lobby has sought
such laws on a state-by-state basis.122
In 1994, California became the first state to allow employers to
obtain a protection order.123 The California Workplace Violence Safety
Act allows an employer to petition for two types of protection orders on
behalf of an employee: (1) a temporary protection order that is good for
up to fifteen days upon the filing of an affidavit124 that demonstrates
reasonable proof that an “employee has suffered unlawful violence or a
119

An emergency protection order is also available in some jurisdictions.
18 U.S.C. § 2266(5) (2000). This means that a protection order issued in one state
must be enforced by any other state, so long as the protection order was “issued for the purpose of
preventing violent or threatening acts or harassment against, or contact or communication with or
physical proximity to, another person.” Id.
121
Riley, supra note 31, at 15, 26 (describing how an employer may obtain a temporary
restraining order (TRO) against offenders under a trespass theory). Riley concludes that “[w]ith such
limited protection at a great cost, the employer must preserve the existing TRO for the most critical
of workplace emergencies.” Id. at 15.
122
SHRM has proposed a Model Workplace Violence Act toolkit to “promote” and
otherwise support state efforts to pass legislation that offers employers this tool. Press Release,
Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt., SHRM Releases New Legislative Proposal, available at
http://www.braunconsulting.com/bcg/workplace2.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2008); Diane Cadrain,
. . . And Stay Out!, SHRM HR MAGAZINE, Aug. 2002, available at http://www.shrm.org/hrmagazine/
articles/0802/0802agn-security.asp; News Brief, Model Workplace Violence Safety Act Established,
10 WORKPLACE VIOLENCE PREVENTION REP. 3 (2004) (summarizing SHRM’s model act). The
toolkit includes materials on how to have such a bill introduced in a state and tips for supporting the
bill through its legislative process to enactment. It also includes a draft bill, supporting testimony,
questions and answers, and a list of potential coalition supporters. Press Release, Soc’y for Human
Res. Mgmt., supra; SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., SUCCESS OF HR VOICE, available at
http://www.shrm.org/government/hrvoice/HRVoice.pdf [hereinafter SHRM, SUCCESS OF HR VOICE]
(last visited Dec. 29, 2007) (using the SHRM State Affairs tool kit has led to new state violence
prevention legislation).
123
Workplace Violence Safety Act, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.8 (2007).
124
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, INSTRUCTIONS FOR PETITIONS TO PROHIBIT
WORKPLACE VIOLENCE (Jan. 1, 2007), at 1, 3, available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/forms/documents/
wv150info.pdf. The employer files a “Petition of Employer for Injunction Prohibiting Violence or
Threats of Violence against Employee.” JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, FORM WV-100:
WORKPLACE VIOLENCE AND APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (Jan. 1, 2007),
available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/forms/fillable/wv100.pdf.
120
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credible threat of violence”125 “that can reasonably be construed to be . . .
or to have been carried out at the workplace”126 and that “irreparable
harm would result to an employee[;]”127 and (2) a permanent protection
order good for up to three years if a hearing is held at which a judge
determines by clear and convincing evidence that the targeted employee
would be subjected to further unlawful violence or credible threat of
violence.128
Since California’s law passed, nine additional states have
granted employers the right to seek a protection order from a court, and
nine other states have considered bills that would allow employers to do
so.129
As a fundamental matter, protection orders are designed to
prevent future violence.130 They are not meant to address past wrongs but
125

CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.8(e).
See id. § 527.8(a). “‘Unlawful violence’ . . . shall not include lawful acts of selfdefense or defense of others.” Id. § 527.8(b)(1). A “[c]redible threat of violence” is defined to
include any “knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable
person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family, and that serves no
legitimate purpose.” Id. § 527.8(b)(2). “Course of conduct” is defined as:
126

[A] pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short,
evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an employee to or
from the place of work; entering the workplace; following an employee during hours of
employment; making telephone calls to an employee; or sending correspondence to an
employee . . . .
Id. § 527.8(b)(3).
127
Id. § 527.8(e).
128
Id. § 527.8(f). The California statute does not require a filing fee to petition or respond
to an employer protection order. Id. § 527.8(p).
129
The following state statutes also provide some form of employer protection order:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1810 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-5-115 (LexisNexis 2002); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-14-102(4)(b) (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-7 (LexisNexis 2004); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-26-6 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); NEV. REV. STAT ANN. §§ 33.200-33.360 (LexisNexis 2006);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-260-271 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-52-2 (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2014-101 to -109 (LexisNexis 2007). Most of these state laws use California’s law as a model. See,
e.g., RUTH D. REICHARD, SECTION BY SECTION SUMMARY OF HOUSE ENROLLED ACT 1232, at 6
(Mar. 21, 2002), http://www.in.gov/judiciary/forms/po/docs/summary.pdf (“[Indiana’s] statute is
based upon California’s statute, which is generally considered to be a model in this area of the
law.”).
Most of these bills faced little opposition and were supported by a range of groups on
all sides of the issue. See, e.g., Workplace Violence Protective Orders: Hearing on A.B. 429 Before
the Cal. S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. 4, 7-8 (2005) (listing support from the
California Alliance Against Domestic Violence, Lambda Letters Project, and Family Law Section of
the State Bar for a bill to expand employer protection orders); Nevada Senate Hearing, supra note 4
(Nevada’s bill was supported by groups ranging from the State Attorney General’s office to the
Nevada Domestic Violence Prevention Council.).
A list of states that recently considered bills that would provide employers with this
tool can be found at LEGAL MOMENTUM, STATE LAW GUIDE: WORKPLACE RESTRAINING ORDERS
3-4 (2008), available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/site/DocServer/Workplace_RO_6.08.08.pdf?
docID=3301.
130
See, e.g., Scripps Health v. Marin, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 86, 89, 94 (Ct. App. 1999). Marin
successfully appealed an employer order that prevented him from contacting any Scripps employees
or coming within 500 yards of their facilities because it was “imposed under factual circumstances
which did not establish a threat of future harm.” Id. at 88-89, 94 (“[A] plaintiff must establish by
clear and convincing evidence . . . that great or irreparable harm would result to an employee if a
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rather are used as a preventative tool. While the exact provisions of the
state laws and proposed bills differ, the underlying assumption is the
same—employers need this preventative tool to proactively seek
protection from a court when people are endangered at work or on the
worksite.
The state laws on which this proposal is based vary as to whom
an employer may seek a protection order on behalf of. In California,
employers are only able to seek an order on behalf of a targeted
employee.131 “Employee” is defined broadly to include “volunteer[s and]
independent contractor[s] who perform[] services . . . at the employer’s
worksite.”132 According to a state court, the employee need not be
“specifically identified by the harasser.”133 In addition, temporary
protection orders may also be sought on behalf of certain household
members of the employee.134
By contrast, Nevada and Arizona allow employers to seek an
order on behalf of anyone in the workplace.135 They do not limit their
protection to employees. An order may be sought in Arkansas if an
employer, employee, or someone invited onto the employer’s property
has suffered or “[r]eceived a threat of violence . . . [that] can reasonably
be construed as a threat which may be carried out at the work site.”136 In
Colorado, a protection order may be issued “in the name of the business
for the protection of the employees” if “imminent danger exists to the
employees.”137
Thus, even though the state laws use different language, they
almost universally cover a broad range of people present in the
workplace—from known, targeted employees to invitees. Accordingly,
my proposal would follow the majority state trend and create a basic

prohibitory injunction were not issued due to the reasonable probability unlawful violence will occur
in the future.”).
131
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.8(a).
132
Id. § 527.8(d).
133
USS-POSCO Indus. v. Edwards, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 54, 56 (Ct. App. 2003). Even though
the statute only permits an employer to seek an order on behalf of an employee, the courts have
interpreted this provision to allow an employer to get an injunction if there have been “generalized
threats of workplace violence . . . on behalf of an employee who is a logical target of the threats.” Id.
134
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.8(e) (stating that an employer who obtains a
temporary protection order “may include other named family or household members who reside with
the employee, or other persons employed at his or her workplace or workplaces” if good cause is
shown).
135
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1810E, F.2 (2003) (stating that courts may grant
“other relief necessary for the protection of the employer, the workplace, the employer’s employees
or any other person who is on or at the employer’s property or place of business or who is
performing official work duties”); NEV. REV. STAT ANN. § 33.240(2) (LexisNexis 2006). Nevada’s
legislators also noted that employers must “show concern about all employees in the workplace, not
just the employee who is the subject of harassment.” Nevada Senate Hearing, supra note 4
(statement of Senator Terry Care).
136
ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-5-115(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2002).
137
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-102(4)(b) (2007).
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federal provision to encourage states to allow employers to utilize this
process on behalf of themselves, their employees, or their customers.
The state laws also vary on another key issue: what constitutes
an employer’s worksite. This is important for two reasons: (1) an order
only may be obtained if violence or threat of violence exists at work; and
(2) the scope of some available relief may be limited to the worksite.
California, Rhode Island, and Arkansas define workplace to
include any location at which the employer’s work is performed.138 To
obtain an order, most of the states require one or more of the threatened
or prior acts of violence to “reasonably be construed to be carried out [or
to have been carried out] at the employee’s place of work.”139 If there is a
threat of violence at work an order may be issued, but the protections
granted under the order are not limited to the workplace.140
All of the state laws allow judges to require perpetrators to stay
away from an employer’s work or property.141 However, work may
include more than the four walls of an employer’s main office. For
example, in County of Marin v. Neufeld,142 the County obtained an
employer protection order to prohibit Neufeld from harassing a County
Commissioner, her husband, and her two stepchildren by following them
to or from work “and from communicating with the protected persons by
any means.”143 Neufeld claimed that the protection order was invalid
because there was no evidence that unlawful acts occurred at the
workplace.144 The California Appellate Court disagreed, holding that
“[b]y its plain language, this statute also extends to cases in which a prior
threat of violence, wherever that threat was made, can reasonably be
construed ‘to be carried out . . . at the work place.’”145 Since the evidence
of a threat of violence could reasonably be construed as a threat that
would be carried out at the workplace, the order was valid—even though

138
ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-5-115(a)(3); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-52-2(a) (2007) (orders
available to prevent “further unlawful acts” from happening at work, “which shall include any place
at which work is being performed on behalf of the employer”); S.F. AIDS Found. v. Best, No.
A095039, 2002 WL 31677132, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2002) (citing Pulaski v. Occupational
Safety & Health Stud. Bd., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 54 (Ct. App. 1999)).
139
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-6-6(2) (LexisNexis 2008). But see Eskanos &
Adler v. Lutge, No. A116279, 2007 WL 4139186, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2007) (upholding a
permanent employer protection order on appeal even though the targeted employee was no longer an
employee of the employer at the time of the hearing).
140
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-5-115(b)(2)(F); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-264(b)(6).
141
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-5-115(b)(2)(A)-(E); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-264(b)(1)-(5).
142
No. A095538, 2002 WL 1375999 (Cal. Ct. App. June 25, 2002).
143
Id. at *1. The County also petitioned to keep Neufeld at least 100 yards from the
employee’s residence and stepchildren’s school. Id. The decision does not note whether this request
was granted.
144
Id. at *5. He argued that the statute “only protects employees who have either suffered
unlawful violence at the workplace or have been threatened with violence while at their workplace.”
Id.
145
Id. at *6-7 (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.8(a) (West 2007)).
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it extended protection to the Commissioner and her family outside of the
office.146
Although the relief granted in an employer protection order
focuses on the worksite, judges are able to offer a wide range of relief
under the “other appropriate relief as necessary” clause.147 This clause
has been used to justify including protections that are typically granted
under other civil protection order statutes. For example, the Neufeld court
noted its authority “to preclude the defendant from coming within a
specified number of yards of the employee, her residence and her family
members.”148 Thus, a protection order may prevent access to an
employee’s home, or access to children, or provide access to any other
relief typically granted in a protection order.149
2. Situations for Which an Employer Might Seek an Order
There are almost always warning signs present before violence
occurs at work or when violent acts occur outside of the workplace but
have an impact on an employee’s work.150 For any number of reasons,
146
Id. at *6 (reasoning that § 527.8 protects the employee at work, even outside his or her
office, when the employee leaves the workplace, and also protects the employee’s family).
147
See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 11-5-115(b)(2)(F) (LexisNexis 2002). Employers who
respond to violence that stems from a labor dispute are not usually able to use the employer
protection order statute to seek an injunction. See, e.g., id. § 11-5-115(h)(1); Nordman v. N.
Manchester Foundry, Inc., 810 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ind. App. 2004) (reversing trial court’s
injunction under the employer protection order statute because the underlying threats related to a
labor dispute and were therefore governed by the Anti-Injunction Act).
148
County of Marin, 2002 WL 1375999, at *7. This would not be the first time the
federal government has regulated workplace safety issues in someone’s home. For example, OSHA
previously declared that employers were responsible for the safety of employees who telecommute
or work from home. Letter from Richard E. Fairfax, Directorate of Compliance Programs, OSHA, to
T. Trahan, CSC Credit Servs. (Nov. 15, 1999), available at http://www.osha.gov/as/opa/foia/hot_4.html.
On January 6, 2000, the letter was rescinded after it was the subject of an attack from the business
community. See Letter from Richard E. Fairfax, Directorate of Compliance Programs, OSHA, to T.
Trahan, CSC Credit Servs. (Jan. 6, 2000), available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?
p_table=INTERPRETATIONp_id=22933 (withdrawing the earlier letter, which “caused widespread
confusion and unintended consequences”); Prepared for a Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Emp.,
Safety, and Training of the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 106th Cong.
(2000) (statement of Charles N. Jeffress, Assistant Secretary For Occupational Safety and Health,
U.S. Department of Labor); Kelly Dunn, Is OSHA Leaving Home?, 79 PERSONNEL J. 26 (Feb. 1,
2000) (“Public outcry immediately followed.”); Kelli L. Dutrow, Working at Home at Your Own
Risk: Employer Liability for the Teleworkers Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 955, 962 (2001) (observing that the “business community responded with an
overwhelming attack on the” original letter); J.C. Howard, At-Home Work Spurs Risk Mgt.
Concerns, 104 NAT’L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. 6 (May 1, 2000)
(OSHA’s initial letter “sparked a thunderclap of media coverage and a barrage of criticism from
business groups. It also ignited a fierce debate.”). Like the OSH Act, the proposed changes to the
SEES and SAFE Act are designed to prevent injury and not to compensate someone for an injury
that has already occurred. See Dutrow, supra at 987 (explaining that the OSH Act is meant to
prevent injury; workers compensation and tort cases are designed to compensate an injured victim).
149
See supra notes 114-118 and accompanying text (describing other relief granted in
protection orders).
150
See Workplace Violence, supra note 57; Riley, supra note 31, at 27 (citing Amy D.
Whitten & Deanne M. Mosley, Caught in the Crossfire: Employers’ Liability for Workplace
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however, a victimized employee may be unwilling to seek a protection
order for herself. My proposal would allow an employer to seek an order
when a threatened employee does not seek one on her own behalf or to
supplement an employee’s individual protection order.
The legislative history of some of the state laws is instructive.
Situations were described where employees asked employers to seek a
protection order out of fear that the perpetrator would take retribution
against the employees if they sought an order themselves.151 When an
employer seeks an order, some of the pressure is removed from the
victim’s shoulders. According to the Arizona Coalition Against
Domestic Violence, the perpetrator’s retribution against the victim may
decrease in this situation because the victim did not seek the order
herself.152 Having an employer seek an order may also increase the
chance of keeping a victim’s current (temporary or permanent) address
away from the perpetrator.153 Other advocates of employer protection
orders have argued that a victim may be encouraged to seek additional
help when an employer seeks a protection order.154 Additionally, a state
Senator in Nevada described a different, and presumably rare, situation:
an employee elected not to seek a protection order on her own behalf,
even after the employer’s counsel explained how to get one and despite
being asked by her employer to do so. The employee was being harassed
by someone who was “incessantly calling the workplace” and parking in
the employer’s parking lot, but she did not seek a protection order
because she did not want her husband to find out she was having an
affair.155 Further, an employer’s claim that an employee has been
subjected to domestic violence or that a protection order is being violated
may be treated more seriously by the police or the courts.156
Alternatively, an employer might seek an order to supplement a
protection order obtained by a victim employee. This situation could
exist when other employees or customers do not have jurisdiction to seek
an order on their own behalf.157 For example, the primary target may
Violence, 70 MISS. L.J. 505, 506 (2000)) (“In 99.9% of violent workplace incidents, warning signs
are present.”).
151
See, e.g., Nevada Senate Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Debra S. Jacobson,
Lobbyist, Southwest Gas Corp.).
152
ARIZONA COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, MANUAL FOR LAY LEGAL
ADVOCATES ASSISTING IN CASES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN ARIZONA 87 (2003), available
at http://www.delapointe.net/diannepost/docs/lay_advocate.pdf.
153
State laws attempt to block access to this information in other ways to maintain a victim’s privacy. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4434 (West 2008) (absent court order, a victim may
not be forced to testify about any new addresses or other information that would make her location
known to the perpetrator).
154
See, e.g., Press Release, Soc’y for Human Res. Mgmt., supra note 122.
155
Nevada Senate Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Senator Care, noting that “the easy
way out for the employer is to say, ‘I do not need this, you are fired’”).
156
Riley, supra note 31, at 27.
157
Workplace Violence Protective Orders: Hearing on A.B. 429 Before the Cal. S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. 3-4 (2005) (explaining similar circumstances under
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obtain a protection order on her own behalf, but the employer may wish
to seek an order on behalf of other employees.158 In another situation, a
perpetrator called a victim employee at work so frequently that the
employer’s telephone system shut down.159 As the Society for Human
Resource Management (“SHRM”) witness correctly noted at the Senate
Hearing, “the [current SEES and SAFE Act] legislation . . . ignores the
inevitable workplace safety issues that will . . . affect other employees.”160
This proposal complements other existing and proposed approaches by
filling in this safety of others gap.161
3. Consultation with the Targeted Employee Required
In an attempt to both recognize the importance of protecting
other parties in the workplace and maintain the safety of a targeted
employee, the proposal would require an employer to consult with an
employee before an employer protection order may be issued.
There is evidence that demonstrates that violence increases
immediately after a perpetrator is served with a protection order.162 As a
result, employers could potentially find themselves in another “catch-22”
situation: an employer needs a protection order because it is concerned
about safety and exposure to civil liability, but the service of an
employer’s protection order on a perpetrator may escalate a violent
situation.163 It would not be good public policy to give employers a tool
that would protect them but also increase the chance that one or more
employees could be hurt.

which an employer may seek an order). An order may also be sought to protect employees from
former disgruntled clients or employees. Id. at 4.
158
See, e.g., Puthukkeril v. Allen, No. A114069, 2007 WL 3112412, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 25, 2007) (one employee sought and received a protection order on her own behalf; employer
sought order on behalf of three other employees who had been threatened).
159
Nevada Senate Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Nancy E. Hart, Deputy Attorney
General, Civil Division).
160
Senate Hearing, supra note 29, at 9 (statement of Sue K. Willman).
161
This Article analyzes only one category of workplace violence—domestic violence.
The other major categories of workplace violence are stranger violence, client/customer violence,
and coworker violence. This amendment would also allow employers to seek protection orders for
other types of violence at work, such as when one employee attacks or harasses another. For
example, an employer could seek a protection order when violence has been threatened but no
employee has been identified as a target. See USS-POSCO Indus. v. Edwards, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 436,
443 (Ct. App. 2003) (finding that there is no need for the employer to demonstrate that the threat of
violence was specific to a certain employee or employees because “[g]iven the legislative intent to
prevent workplace violence, it would indeed be absurd to read the statute [that way]”). Interestingly,
a majority of the state laws were enacted after 9/11.
162
See, e.g., David M. Zlotnick, Empowering the Battered Woman: The Use of Criminal
Contempt Sanctions to Enforce Civil Protection Orders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153, 1186 n.155, 1193
n.182 (1995) (citations omitted) (citing a study that suggests the risk of violence increases and
newspaper articles that describe examples of violence that occurred “because the victim was
attempting to leave the relationship or avail herself of a legal remedy such as a protection order”).
163
Kari Ricci, Chapter 476: A Three-Pronged Approach to Addressing Issues of
Domestic and Workplace Violence, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 61, 71 (2007).
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In an effort to combat this “catch-22” and protect the victim
employees, employers should be required to notify or otherwise engage
in an interactive process with the targeted employees to ensure they have
knowledge of the employer’s efforts to seek a protection order. This
interactive process would require employers to engage in a dialogue with
the victim about safety planning and other available resources.
Ultimately, however, an employer would be able to obtain a protection
order with or without the support of the victim employee.
This proposal follows the requirements of some of the state laws.
Nevada and Arizona require employers to “make a good faith effort” to
notify the targeted employee of the employer’s intent to seek an order.164
North Carolina goes one step further by requiring employers to confer
with the targeted employee before seeking an order “to determine
whether any safety concerns exist in relation to the employee’s
participation in the process.”165 North Carolina does not, however,
require employers to engage with the targeted employee about the
employer’s decision to seek an order or have it served on the
perpetrator.166 Other state statutes are silent on the issue.167
One of the other titles of the proposed SEES and SAFE Act
would play an important role here. Title III would preclude adverse
employment actions from being taken on the basis of someone’s actual
or perceived status as a victim of domestic violence.168 This protection
would guarantee that employees would not be disciplined or fired for
discussing events related to domestic violence with their employers or
taking time off to testify in a court proceeding related to the employer’s
petition for a protection order.169
This anti-discrimination protection means that employees would
not be economically disadvantaged at work if they elect not to participate
in an employer’s petition. Nonetheless, these orders would be
controversial. They remove the choice of whether and/or when to obtain
protection from the hands of the victim. To be clear, the proposed
amendment would not require an employer to obtain the victim
164
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1810.L (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.260
(LexisNexis 2006).
165
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-261 (2007) (emphasis added).
166
Id. The state is concerned with ensuring that the act of testifying or providing
information to the employer does not place the employee in danger; it is not meant to combat the
potential harm that may result if an order is obtained and served.
167
See generally CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.8 (West Supp. 2008) (no provision
indicating a requirement on employers to notify targeted employee(s) of an intent to seek an order);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-102 (2007) (same).
168
SAFE Act, H.R. 2395, 110th Cong. § 303(a)(1)(A) (2007).
169
Id. § 303(a)(1). North Carolina combats this problem in a different way: the state law
contains an anti-retaliation provision preventing employers from disciplining targeted employees
that “are unwilling to participate in the process.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-261. Deborah Widiss notes
that victims may be voluntarily more helpful in employer’s efforts to obtain injunctive relief if they
do not fear that they will be fired for discussing actual or threatened violence with their employers.
Widiss, supra note 25, manuscript at 4.
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employee’s consent as a prerequisite to seeking an order. But it would
require an employer to consult with the employee. Consultation is
necessary to ensure the employee understands what actions are being
taken and has the opportunity to take appropriate safety precautions,170
but consent (although preferable) cannot be required because it does not
take into account the potential these orders have to protect other
members of the workplace community.
Historically, protection order statutes were created to allow the
victim to have a self-initiated process by which she could seek safety and
be given a voice in her situation.171 This proposal does not eliminate an
employee’s ability to seek her own protection order. Moreover, although
the ultimate decision to seek an employer protection order remains with
the employer, the proposal attempts to ensure that the victim is given a
role in the employer protection order process if she wants it.
In some respects, this provision is similar to mandatory arrest
and no-drop prosecution policies.172 In mandatory arrest jurisdictions,173
police officers must arrest a suspect if probable cause exists that an act of
domestic violence has been committed, regardless of whether the victim
desires an arrest to occur or the police officer has obtained a warrant.174 A
primary purpose of mandatory arrest statutes is to remove police
discretion and victim and witness hindsight from the arrest process.175
Before mandatory arrest policies became popular, and in jurisdictions
without them, police officers had discretion over this decision and had
the ability to take the victim’s preference into account.176
No-drop prosecution eliminates a prosecutor’s discretion to bring
a criminal charge against an alleged perpetrator and removes the
prosecutor’s ability to consider the victim’s wishes in deciding whether
170
See, e.g., Nevada Senate Hearing, supra note 4 (statement of Mark S. Sertic, counsel
for the Nevada Human Resources Association) (one purpose of this notification provision is to allow
an employee to make safety arrangements that do not involve the workplace).
171
See Jane Aiken & Kathy Goldwasser, The Perils of Empowerment, manuscript at 1112 (on file with author).
172
Mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution laws are not universally approved of and
have a significant number of detractors. See, e.g., ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN &
FEMINIST LAWMAKING 186 (2000) (describing mandatory arrest provisions as “paternalistic” and
noting that they re-victimize victims as a result of “coercion at the hands of the state” and by
removing a woman’s autonomy); Erin L. Han, Mandatory Arrest And No-Drop Policies: Victim
Empowerment In Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159, 162 (2003) (“call[ing]
the appropriateness of these policies into question” because they “intrude upon the autonomy of
victims”).
173
Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have mandatory arrest provisions. Vi
T. Vu, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales: A Hindrance in Domestic Violence Policy Reform and
Victory for the Institution of Male Dominance, 9 SCHOLAR 87, 97 (2006).
174
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-6-803.5(3)(b) to 803.6 (2008); see also Han, supra
note 172, at 174-81 (summarizing mandatory arrest policies).
175
See Gonzales Amicus Brief, supra note 116, at 6 (Mandatory arrest provisions
“promote the safety of women and children, especially in light of the considerable research and data
that demonstrate the dangers to women and children of attempting to separate from their abuser.”).
176
See Han, supra note 172, at 161, 174 (discussing mandatory arrest laws which remove
police discretion).
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to proceed.177 Under no-drop prosecution policies, the victim is often
required to participate in the prosecution, even if she affirmatively does
not want to participate or does not want the prosecution to occur.178 In
essence, the victim becomes a witness like any other witness in the
criminal case.
As noted above, the proposed employer protection order
provision would take the ultimate choice of whether to seek a protection
order out of the hands of the targeted employee. But that is where the
comparison to mandatory arrest and/or no-drop prosecution provisions
must end. Unlike these policies, the proposal to amend the SEES and
SAFE Act would essentially place employers in a position similar to the
one police officers were in before mandatory arrest provisions existed in
that employers are not required to seek a protection order. Instead, after
consulting with the targeted employee, they may elect not to seek an
order.179 However, just like police officers were required to consider the
safety of others in determining whether or not to arrest someone for a
crime involving domestic violence, so too are employers required to
consider their duty to maintain a safe workplace for others. Moreover, if
after consultation with the employee, an employer elects to seek an
order, they may be in a similar situation as a prosecutor in a no-drop
prosecution jurisdiction. In seeking an order, employers do not need to
use testimony from the victims or force a victim to participate.
Employers can use evidence gathered from other employees, third
parties, or their own business records (such as computer, phone, and
visitor logs). In sum, an employer may obtain a protection order without
testimony from the targeted employee.180
4. Employers Still Have a Duty to Provide a Safe Workplace,
Even with Immunity Against Negligence Claims
Allowing an employer to seek a protection order does not have
to eliminate or expand an employer’s duty to maintain a safe workplace.
States could be required to include a provision that explicitly states that
177

See id. at 181 (summarizing no-drop prosecution policies).
Id. at 161-62 (“No-drop policies require prosecution of a domestic violence
perpetrator, regardless of the victim’s wishes, and often force the victim to participate in the
prosecutorial process.”).
179
For example, CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.8 (West Supp. 2008) was “intended to
provide optional remedies which supplement rather than replace existing remedies against
workplace violence, and does not obligate an employer to seek those optional remedies.” Franklin v.
Monadnock Co., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 696-97 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
180
For example, an employer sought a protection order on behalf of twenty-two
employees, but submitted affidavits from only six in San Francisco Aids Foundation v. Best, No.
A095039, 2002 WL 31677132 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2002). The lack of testimony from every
employee was immaterial. Id. at *4. The court noted “the obvious fact that testimony from each
employee is not required if there is other substantial evidence to support the finding that they
suffered an act of violence or credible threat of violence.” Id.
178
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the employer protection order statute does not “[e]xpand, diminish, alter
or modify the duty of an employer to provide a safe workplace for its
employees and other persons.”181 The purpose of this proposal is to
provide a tool for employers to address violence at work, not to change
their duty to provide a safe workplace.
Employers need to be able to seek a protection order without
expanding their liability under other laws. Assuming actions are taken in
good faith, employers should be granted civil immunity for any action
taken to seek a protection order. This immunity would serve as an
affirmative defense against tort claims brought by victim employees,
coworkers, or third parties for acting or failing to act pursuant to this law.
Some state laws already do this.182 For example, Arizona,
Arkansas, Rhode Island, and Nevada provide immunity to employers for
actions taken in good faith under the employer protection order law.
These states create a rebuttable presumption that employers act in good
faith unless a “lack of good faith” is demonstrated.183 Colorado provides
a more limited immunity that applies only to an employer’s decision not
to seek a protection order.184 Unlike the other states, Nevada also
specifically grants immunity to employers who fail to seek an order
regardless of whether the decision not to seek an order was made in good
faith.185 In addition, Arkansas’s immunity provision also protects
employees and invitees from negligence claims arising out of a decision
not to use the protections granted in the act.186

181
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1810(K)(1) (2003); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-7(h)
(2004) (“[This law shall not be] construed as expanding, diminishing, altering, or modifying the
duty, if any, of an employer to provide a safe workplace for employees and other persons.”); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-26-6-15 (LexisNexis 2008) (“[The law] may not be construed to . . . expand,
diminish, alter, or modify the duty, if any, of an employer to provide a safe workplace for an
employee or another person.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.360(1) (LexisNexis 2006) (stating that
the law does not change an employer’s duty to provide a safe workplace); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-271
(2007) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-14-108 (LexisNexis 2007) (same). Some of these states
clarify that the employer protection order laws do not prevent employers or employees from
“pursu[ing] any other civil or criminal remedy provided by law.” See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95271; TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-14-108. This is just another way of saying that utilizing the provisions
of the law are optional and do not alter one’s duties under current law.
182
Some states have also granted civil liability to employers in a related area—reference
checks. These laws immunize employers who are asked about a current or former employee by a
prospective employer. For example, Florida grants immunity for any information provided in a
reference unless clear and convincing evidence exists that false information was knowingly given.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (2005). SHRM has also taken a position and created a legislative toolkit
for reference-check legislation. See SHRM, SUCCESS OF HR VOICE, supra note 122, at 3.
183
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1810(P); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-5-115(f) (2002); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.340(1) (LexisNexis 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-52-2(e) (2003). Except in
Nevada, the “lack of good faith” must be “shown by clear and convincing evidence.” ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-1810(P); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-5-115(f); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-52-2(e).
184
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-102(4)(b) (2007) (“An employer shall not be liable for
failing to obtain a civil protection order in the name of the business for the protection of the
employees and patrons.”).
185
See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.340(1).
186
ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-5-115(g).

412

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:2

Even in states that do not explicitly provide employers with
immunity, few cases have challenged an employer for “using, misusing,
or failing to use” the employer protection order statute.187 Moreover, a
limited provision for employers has been created by case law in some of
the states without specific statutory immunity. For example, a California
state appellate court held that a malicious prosecution action could not be
brought against an employer who filed for an employer protection order
in Robinzine v. Vicory.188 The employer had obtained a temporary
protection order against an employee’s spouse.189 During the hearing for
a permanent protection order, however, the employer was not able to
prove unlawful violence against any employee and the court dissolved
the temporary order and denied the petition for a permanent order.190 The
employee’s spouse brought a malicious prosecution action on the basis of
“phony allegations of workplace violence” that were not enough to
sustain a protection order and were “a pretext for further harassment and
retaliation.”191 The state court of appeals held that employers are immune
from any such claim.192
In addition to immunizing actions taken while deciding to seek a
protection order, the proposal would prevent evidence of this decision
from being admitted as evidence in a negligence case. This provision—
based on state laws—would prevent any act or statement made while
seeking a protection order from being introduced as evidence.193 For
example, Nevada prevents any such statement from being “deemed an
admission by the employer of any fact.”194 Under the proposal, this
evidence would still be admissible in intentional tort claims.
An alternative would be to allow this evidence to be introduced
for impeachment purposes only. A number of states do this. For example,
in Arizona and Nevada, any act or statement of an employer used to
obtain an injunction may not be deemed an admission of any fact but
may be used for the purposes of impeachment.195 But the potential
prejudicial nature of this evidence dictates that it not be introduced at all
(as opposed to having it introduced for the limited purpose of
impeaching a witness).

187
Riley, supra note 31, at 20-21 (reporting that no cases were brought in California from
1994 to 2002).
188
50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 65, 66 (Ct. App. 2006).
189
Id. at 67.
190
Id.
191
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
192
Id. at 66, 71.
193
See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-52-2(f) (2003).
194
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.340(2) (LexisNexis 2006).
195
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1810(P) (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.340(2).
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5. Properly Enforced Protection Orders Combat Future
Violence
The liability provision discussed above demonstrates that this
proposal would limit an employer’s liability for utilizing this tool to
address domestic violence at work. But the question remains whether a
protection order actually deters violence and helps to create a safer
workplace. Recently, protection orders have been called into question for
two reasons: (1) there is notoriously bad enforcement of protection order
violations; and (2) some people believe that there is little evidence that
protection orders are effective in protecting the petitioner or preventing
further violence.196
With respect to the first concern about the effectiveness of
protection orders, there is substantial evidence of poor efforts to enforce
protection orders, even in states with “mandatory” arrest policies.197 In
some respects, “[p]rotection orders . . . are only as effective as their
enforcement[, and a]n order without enforcement can create a false sense
of security for victims of domestic violence.”198 This safety rationale is
one of the driving forces behind calls for mandatory enforcement of
protection orders.199 But the Supreme Court has hampered these calls.
In 2005, Castle Rock v. Gonzales presented the Supreme Court
with the issue of whether an abused wife and her now-deceased children
had the right to sue the city for its failure to enforce a temporary
restraining and child custody order pursuant to the mandatory
enforcement language present in Colorado’s domestic violence statute.200
The Court held that the state could be immune from liability for failing to
comply with a mandatory arrest law.201 In essence, the court held that the
word “mandatory” meant something else.202
196
See, e.g., Michelle R. Waul, Civil Protection Orders: An Opportunity for Intervention
with Domestic Violence Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 51, 54 (2000) (mentioning studies from
the 1980s—and later studies clarifying those findings—that “reported that having a protection order
did not reduce the likelihood of subsequent violence”).
197
See Ko, supra note 113, at 380-81 & nn.160-67.
198
Gonzales Amicus Brief, supra note 116, at 9; see also Ko, supra note 113, at 379-80
(describing studies that conclude that poor enforcement by prosecutors and judges of protection
orders has hampered their value).
199
See, e.g., Gonzales Amicus Brief, supra note 116, at 2-3 (All thirteen organizations
that signed the brief “believe that mandatory protection order enforcement is required to ensure the
safety of abused women and children.”).
200
545 U.S. 748, 751-54 (2005). This author was part of the team that drafted an amicus
brief in this case on behalf of the Family Violence Prevention Fund, the National Center on
Domestic and Sexual Violence, and eleven other organizations. See Gonzales Amicus Brief, supra
note 116. The brief argued for the recognition and protection of separate procedural due process
rights and rights to protection under the order for the three Gonzales children (allegedly protected
parties under the order). Id. at 18-19. The brief also addressed how the police’s failure to grant the
children even minimal due process undermined both the order and well-established judicial and
legislative efforts to protect victims of domestic violence. Id. at 25-26.
201
Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 760-63.
202
See also Tarr, supra note 39, at 401 (noting that Castle Rock “undercuts the notion that
a nationwide commitment to protecting victims of domestic violence exists [creating] the potential
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With respect to the second critique, there is conflicting
evidence.203 But there is anecdotal evidence that individual victims and
employers are seeking protection orders in hopes that they are
effective.204 For example, the California State Attorney General’s Office
reports that there were 1518 active employer protection orders in the
California Domestic Violence Restraining Order System (“DVROS”) on
February 23, 2005.205 Moreover, there is something powerful about
having a court issued document that states a protective right. It empowers
employers to call the police or take action. While it is true that the police
could be called if an unwanted trespasser enters the employer’s property
regardless of whether an employer has obtained a valid order against the
person, violating a protection order in and of itself is a crime.
Protection orders state as much on the face of the document
themselves. For example, the Indiana Workplace Harassment Order
states, “Violation of this order is punishable by confinement in jail,
prison, and/or a fine.”206 And while an order is merely a piece of paper
that may or may not be enforced, there is something powerful about
putting a perpetrator on notice that someone else is watching and that
violating the order has consequences in and of itself.
You can never stop violence completely, but early
intervention—including the ability to rely on a protection order—should
help make the workplace safer.

for employers to use the holding to support their argument that there is no public policy on which to
hang an exception to the at-will employment doctrine”).
203
Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order Coverage: A
Call For Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 123 (2005) (contrasting early studies that concluded
that protection orders failed to prevent additional violence with more recent studies finding that
protection orders do reduce future harm); Larry Zalin, Protection Orders Curb Partner Violence, but
Few Seek Them, U. OF WASH. NEWS, Jan. 2, 2003, http://uwnews.washington.edu/ni/article.asp?article
ID=2031 (protection orders kept women “safer than those without them in the five-month period
after they were initially threatened or abused,” and the protection grew stronger after another four
months); REPORT FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S TASK FORCE ON LOCAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, KEEPING THE PROMISE: VICTIM SAFETY AND BATTERER
ACCOUNTABILITY 16 (2005) [hereinafter REPORT FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S TASK FORCE],
available at http://www.safestate.org/documents/DV_Report_AG.pdf (citing studies demonstrating
that protection orders “are associated with decreased likelihood of subsequent physical and nonphysical domestic violence”).
204
See Gonzales Amicus Brief, supra note 116, at 9 (noting that protection orders are one
of the most utilized forms of legal recourse for victims of domestic violence).
205
Workplace Violence Protective Orders: Hearing on A.B. 429 Before the Cal. S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. 2 (2005) (noting information given by the Attorney
General’s office). DVROS is the system in which all enforceable orders are recorded. Id. at 1.
206
Order After Hearing on Petition of Employer for Injunction Prohibiting Violence or
Threats of Violence Against Employee, Form WV-0106 (Jul. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/forms/po/wvro/wv-0106.pdf; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.8(k)
(West 2008) and CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.6 (West 2008) (intentional violation of a protection order
is a crime). “The threat of punishment is intended to deter abusers, both those subject to an order and
batterers in general, from engaging in prohibited contact, thereby decreasing the risk of new
domestic violence.” REPORT FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S TASK FORCE, supra note 203, at 16.
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6. Congressional Action Is Appropriate
In 2000, the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Morrison held that Congress could not create a federal civil cause of
action for a claim of gender-motivated violence because it was not
sufficiently related to interstate commerce.207 The Court held that the new
claim went beyond Congress’s power, despite evidence in the legislative
history showing a substantial impact on interstate commerce.208 After
Morrison, it is unclear whether a proposal that created a new federal
cause of action could withstand a constitutional challenge, but this is a
question for which it is worth grappling.209
Nonetheless, it is a question that need not be answered here
because Congress can encourage states to provide the tools described in
this section. While Congress has no authority to force states to enact this
proposal, it can condition certain federal funds on a state’s decision to do
so. Pursuant to the Spending Clause,210 Congress may attach conditions
on a state’s receipt of federal funds to advance policy, provided any such
requirements are unambiguous and clearly stated, made in the pursuit of
the “general welfare,” and voluntarily and knowingly accepted by the
state.211 Thus, Congress could encourage states to enact the proposal

207
529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000). For a more detailed discussion of Morrison, see Tarr, supra
note 39, at 391-92; see also Jennifer R. Hagan, Can We Lose the Battle and Still Win the War?: The
Fight Against Domestic Violence After the Death of Title III of the Violence Against Women Act, 50
DEPAUL L. REV. 919, 925 (2001) (proposing the use of the Thirteenth Amendment for this type
of claim).
208
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
209
The proposed employer protection order provisions are different than the invalidated
federal claim contained in 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000). Unlike the cause of action in Morrison, an
employer protection order has a more direct economic link to and effect on interstate commerce.
Morrison involved a freshman woman who was allegedly assaulted and raped by two members of
the football team at Virginia Polytechnic Institute. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602. Tragic as these alleged
events were, the factual situation is very different from the ones that the proposal under discussion
here attempts to address. Morrison was not an employee or independent contractor of the school. As
a result, the proposal here contains a much more direct link to employment and would offer
employers a way to get involved when there have been acts or threats of action at or impacting work.
The proposal is not to make domestic violence itself a federal crime or to provide a federal cause of
action that would involve the potential for compensatory or punitive damages. Instead, it is offering
a civil protection order response to domestic violence at work. In essence, it would regulate the
workplace just like the FMLA, OSH Act and any number of other laws. Of course, an employer
protection order issued under a current state law that allows them would be enforceable in every
other state under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 18 U.S.C. § 2266(5) (2000).
210
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States. . . .”).
211
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006)
(citations omitted); see also Ann Carey Juliano, The More You Spend, The More You Save: Can the
Spending Clause Save Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1111, 1155-56 (2001);
W. Paul Koenig, Does Congress Abuse Its Spending Clause Power by Attaching Conditions on the
Receipt of Federal Law Enforcement Funds to a State’s Compliance With “Megan’s Law”?, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 721, 722-23 (1998) (detailing the authority for and analyzing the legality
and appropriateness of Congress’s decision to condition federal law enforcement funds on the state’s
establishment of certain sex offender registry requirements).
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described in this section by tying them to the provision of appropriate
federal funds.
A significantly weaker second alternative also exists: the SEES
and SAFE Act could be amended to include a new title that expresses a
sense of Congress that states should provide the provisions of this
proposal.212
C.

Creating a Refundable Tax Credit for Employers That Take
Safety Precautions

The current text of the SEES and SAFE Act would impose a
number of mandates on employers requiring them to take affirmative
steps to address domestic violence.213 Another way to tackle the societal
goal of reducing violence at work is through a tax credit or other
financial incentive.214 The third proposal utilizes this concept of using the
tax system to encourage employers to proactively take steps to address
violence at work by providing a refundable business tax credit to
employers to recoup certain costs associated with addressing domestic
violence.215 It also would earmark money to the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”) to publicize this new credit and contain language granting
212
See, e.g., H.R. 3514, 105th Cong. § 761 (1998). This section contains a Sense of
Congress statement regarding ways in which state workers compensation laws could address this
problem by expressing the sense of the Congress that “State workers’ compensation laws should
provide benefits to [eligible female] victims of workplace violence[,] . . . including full
compensation for physical and nonphysical injuries;” and “permit the employee to pursue an action
at law . . . other than statutory workers’ compensation benefits, based on an employer’s role in the
act of workplace violence.” Id. § 761(b)(1)-(2).
213
For example, Title I would mandate the provision of time off to employees who are
victims of domestic violence. SAFE Act, H.R. 2395, 110th Cong. tit. 1, §§ 101-108 (2007).
214
While this section focuses on tax credits, there are a number of other financial
incentives that could be utilized to incentivize employers to take measures to address the impact of
domestic violence at work. Government sponsored grant programs are one commonly discussed
alternative to tax credits. One benefit of utilizing a grant program is that the cost to the government
of the grant would be known in advance and before any such program was implemented. For
example, the Women in Apprenticeship and Nontraditional Occupations Act gives the Department
of Labor authority to offer grants to community based organizations to deliver technical assistance to
employers and labor organizations to help them recruit, train, employ, and retain women in
“apprenticeable . . . and nontraditional occupations.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2509 (1992). By statute,
only one million dollars was designated to administer this grant program. Id. § 2509.
215
This proposal also responds to a direct request from the business community that,
“[i]nstead of burdening small employers, Congress might consider incentives for employers to
provide additional resources or benefits to [victim employees].” Senate Hearing, supra note 29, at 14
(statement of Sue K. Willman).
The government imposes a tax on businesses every year at a rate that varies depending
on the amount of “taxable income” generated. 26 U.S.C. § 11(a)-(b) (2006). A business’s tax
liability consists of its gross income minus any authorized deductions. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS IN EFFECT FOR 2008 8 (2008), available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-32-08.pdf. Business “tax liability [may also be reduced] by any
applicable tax credits.” Id. at 9. A tax credit reduces the taxpayer’s tax amount dollar for dollar.
Kimberly Lankford, Tax Credit vs. Deduction, KIPLINGER.COM, Mar. 19, 2007, http://www.kiplinger.com/
columns/ask/archive/2007/q0319.htm. It is more valuable than an equivalent tax deduction, which
allows the incurred expense to be subtracted from the taxpayer’s gross income and lowers the overall
taxable income. See id.
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employers civil immunity from liability in negligence actions taken
while seeking or failing to seek the credit. In so doing, this proposal
recognizes that the government has a role to play in helping employers
reduce violence in the workplace. The government, through the
refundable tax credit,216 can incentivize action and educate employers on
how to appropriately deal with the effects of violence at work.
Under the first element of this proposal, employers could recoup
some percentage of costs related to addressing domestic violence through
a refundable tax credit for acts or programs such as: training employees
to recognize warning signs for potential violence and educating them on
available options if violence occurs; purchasing new identification
systems or lighting or security equipment; hiring new security personnel;
organizing escorts to walk people to their cars; establishing an employee
assistance program that provides services related to domestic violence
(such as counseling or referral services); retaining counsel to help
employees seek protection orders; hiring a financial counselor to aid
employees trying to leave a violent situation; relocating an employee to
another facility; implementing time off or flexible work policies; or
creating or following personal policies to protect or support victimized
employees.
An employer that performs these acts needs to be aware that
some of them may potentially be considered taxable income for an
employee under section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code.217 As a result,
216

Generally, refundable tax credits are only for individual tax liability. The primary
federal refundable tax credit programs are the Earned Income Tax Credit, 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2000), the
Child Tax Credit, 26 U.S.C. § 24 (2000), and a health insurance tax credit, 26 U.S.C. § 35 (2000). A
few states, however, have established refundable tax credits for business. For example, the Nebraska
Advantage Microenterprise Tax Credit Act allows companies with five or less employees to qualify
for a 20% refundable tax credit for up to $10,000 of a new investment in a struggling community.
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77-5906 (LexisNexis 2007); see also Michelle Janowitz, Nebraska’s New
Advantage, BUS. FACILITIES ONLINE, Oct. 2005, http://www.businessfacilities.com/bf_05_10_analysis2.php
(describing this program as part of “a new set of incentives designed to grow”).
A refundable credit is recommended here to ensure that an employer would receive
money back even if the employer had no tax liability. If this were a non-refundable tax credit, an
employer that does not have any tax liability would not get any money back. 360 Degrees of
Financial Literacy, Refundable Versus Non-Refundable Tax Credits, http://www.valueyourmoney.org/
military-and-reserves/taxcredit.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2008).
217
26 U.S.C. § 61 (2000). Some of these are already excluded from income. For example,
help provided under qualified employee assistance and education programs is not considered income
to employees. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., TAX EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS: AN UPDATE FROM THE FY 2005 BUDGET 1-2 (2004), available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0204fact.pdf (listing examples of tax exempt employee
benefits).
Some of the costs associated with these activities may be considered “ordinary and
necessary” business expenses. Under the Internal Revenue Code, ordinary and necessary business
expenses may reduce an employer’s overall tax liability. 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (2000). The Code does
not define the terms “ordinary” or “necessary”. Agency guidance, however, has defined an
“ordinary” business expense to be one that is “common and accepted” in a trade or business. IRS,
Business Expenses, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=109807,00.html (last visited
Sept. 19, 2008). A “necessary” expense must be “helpful and appropriate” in a trade or business; it
need not be indispensable. Id. In addition, these costs must not be deemed personal expenses. See
Paul Caron, What is an “Ordinary” Business Expense Under § 162?, Dec. 5, 2006,
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the proposal would require employers to notify an employee of any
possibility that a service they are willing to give the employee would
count as income under the Code. In addition, the Secretary of Treasury
would be given the authority to certify costs that may be included in the
calculation of the tax credit. Employers would then submit a certification
containing all eligible costs to the IRS with their regular tax filing.218
The proposed tax credit would be available to all private
employers.219 Rather than limiting the credit to employers with only a
certain number of employees, the tax credit would be tiered, with the
greatest percentage of credit going to small employers.220 In essence, this
would stagger the credit based on the number of employees that an
employer has (much like the Earned Income Tax Credit staggers the
amount depending on the number of dependent children in a family221).
This tiered approach is suggested to allow the largest incentive to
go to smaller employers who have the hardest time adapting their
workplace to address or otherwise assist victims dealing with the
aftermath of domestic violence. Indeed, small employers are frequently
faced with limited resources and conflicting legal and moral
obligations.222 These employers “often have neither the resources nor the
staffs” to appropriately address domestic violence.223 They may see
“prevention . . . as an unwarranted expenditure rather than an investment
with a return.”224 This tiered approach attempts to combat that philosophy
by targeting the most support and greatest monetary incentive towards
prevention efforts at small business.

http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2006/12/what_is_an_ordi.html (for example, courts have
denied the deduction of expenses for hiring a minister for a business’s employees because the
services provided are of an inherently personal nature).
To the extent these costs qualify for the ordinary and necessary business deduction, a
legislative fix would not be needed to allow businesses to claim them. The IRS could do a great
service by issuing guidance and/or other technical assistance that explicitly states whether these
expenses may be claimed as such.
218
As with all self-reported aspects of the tax system, an underreporting issue may result.
However, one goal of the earmark is to have it be large enough to provide additional staff for
enforcement related activities to attempt to limit the scope of this problem.
219
Certain employers would be exempt from this proposal because they are not subject to
federal tax liability. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(a), (c) (listing organizations that are exempt from paying
federal income tax). A grant program or some other financial incentive—perhaps the budget process
for government employers—may incentivize these employers to act.
220
The majority of Americans work for small businesses. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
STATISTICS ABOUT BUSINESS SIZE (INCLUDING SMALL BUSINESS) FROM THE U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/smallbus.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2008) (listing statistics for
2002).
221
26 U.S.C. § 32(b) (2000).
222
Michael A. Mayo, Ethical Problems Encountered by U.S. Small Businesses in
International Marketing, 29 J. OF SMALL BUS. MGMT. 51-59 (1991), available at http://www.allbusiness.com/
human-resources/employee-development-employee-ethics/163877-1.html (last visited Sept. 29,
2008) (stating that small businesses have limited resources, such as no legal specialists, to deal with
issues and ethical dilemmas); see also NIOSH, supra note 60, § 2.1.8.
223
NIOSH, supra note 60, § 2.1.8.
224
Id. (also noting small employers “fac[e] high risks” of violence at work).
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The second element of this proposal posits that Congress should
earmark money to the IRS for activities related to education and
enforcement of this new tax credit.225 This earmark could fund education
efforts about the tax credit through programs such as staffing a 1-800
number that employers could call to have questions answered or putting
on a road show or Internet road show to educate a broader range of
businesses and locations.226 It also could provide technical assistance
about which costs are eligible for inclusion in the tax credit.
In addition, the staff could refer callers to other entities with the
capability to provide technical assistance on steps employers can take to
address domestic violence at work. For example, the National Workplace
Resource Center would be an ideal referral partner for the IRS on this
issue. The National Workplace Resource Center was created as part of
the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act of 2005
(“VAWA 2005”).227 VAWA 2005 authorized a grant to a private nonprofit entity to operate a national clearinghouse to help businesses
develop and implement policies, guidelines, and plans to make their
workplaces safer and more productive while supporting domestic
violence victims.228 Taken together, this earmark has the potential to fund
activities related to education about both the existence and requirements
of the tax credit, as well as referrals and information from subject matter
experts on how to prepare an effective safety plan.
The third element of this proposal contains civil liability
language that mirrors the employer protection order proposal described
above.229 In sum, it would note that an employer’s duty to provide a safe
workplace does not change because the employer obtained a tax credit
(or other monetary incentive) under the SEES and SAFE Act. Nor would
an employer be able to escape liability under other laws simply because
it sought or obtained this credit. Of course, this proposal would not
immunize employers against charges of tax evasion or any IRS
enforcement action related to statements or acts made or not made while
applying for, utilizing, or justifying or clarifying an employer’s
eligibility for or calculation of this tax credit.
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James M. Buchanan, The Economics of Earmarked Taxes, 71 J. POL. ECON. 457, 45758 (1963) (“‘Earmarking’ is defined as the practice of designating or dedicating specific revenues to
the financing of specific public services.”).
226
For example, the current efforts of the Employee Benefits Security Administration to
educate employers about fiduciary liability can be found at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/ (last visited
Jan. 24, 2009).
227
Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, 42
U.S.C. § 14043f (2006). This center was first introduced in an earlier version of the SAFE Act. See
Battered Women’s Economic Security Act, S.2558, 105th Cong. § 211 (1998) (proposing a National
Clearinghouse on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault in the Workplace Grant).
228
42 U.S.C. § 14043f(a) (2006). VAWA 2005 appropriates $1 million annually for five
years starting in fiscal year 2007 for this purpose. Id. § 14043(e).
229
See supra Section III.B for a discussion of the proposed civil liability provision.
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Parts of this proposal are based on a tax provision included in
earlier versions of the SEES and SAFE Act that would have amended the
Code to provide a tax credit equal to 40% of the costs an employer paid
for violence prevention, safety, and education programs.230 Similar tax
credits have also been proposed on the state level. A California bill
would have authorized a tax credit for employers who establish and
maintain “resources or educational programs to raise awareness of
domestic violence in the workplace.”231 Section 1 (c) stated, “In order to
encourage businesses to develop workplace domestic violence programs
that educate, support, and protect their employees, this act provides a 75percent tax credit for businesses that offer a domestic violence program.
This tax credit is intended to reduce the cost of providing these
programs.”232 Illinois and Hawaii also entertained proposals that would
have entitled employers to a tax credit equal to 40% of the domestic
violence safety and education costs paid or incurred by the employer
during the taxable year.233 The states would have certified the costs
eligible for the credit or otherwise created appropriate forms.234
Missouri’s bills would have authorized a tax credit for an employer’s
expenses in developing domestic violence prevention programs.235
Finally, North Carolina’s bill would have provided a tax credit equal to
the amount expended on a workplace safety program.236 None of these
bills became law or are up for consideration at this time.
Since a tax credit provides employers with an incentive to
address violence at work without requiring employers to do anything, it
involves a more incremental change than some of the other provisions of
the SEES and SAFE Act.237 For example, in contrast, the antidiscrimination provisions of Title III would require an immediate change
in the way some employers do business.238 Nonetheless, it would still be
a change, and with the right outreach and education, a significant one
whose importance would only be expanded when combined with the
other protections of the proposed SEES and SAFE Act.239

230
See, e.g., Battered Women’s Economic Security Act, S. 2558, 105th Cong. 2d Sess.
§ 45D (1998). However, the federal bills introduced since 2005 have not contained such a provision.
231
S. 1691 § 3, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000).
232
Id.
233
H. 3428, 93d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2003); H. 2123, 21st Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Haw. 2001); S. 2438, 21st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2001).
234
H. 3428 (Ill. 2003); H. 2123 (Haw. 2001); S. 2438 (Haw. 2001).
235
H.B. 428, 93rd Gen. Assem. (Mo. 2005); H.B. 429, 93rd Gen. Assem. (Mo. 2005).
236
Workplace Safety Tax Credits, S.B. 680, 2003-2004 Gen. Assem. (N.C. 2003).
237
See Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional
Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2080 (1996) (noting “the inherent difficulty of using incremental
changes in financial incentives and entitlements to influence patterns of behavior that reflect deepseated attitudes about gender roles”).
238
SAFE Act, H.R. 2395, § 303(a) (2007).
239
Alstott, supra note 237, at 2005 (noting “the limited capacity of legal rules governing
financial entitlements to change deeply entrenched social norms about gender roles” and concluding
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This proposal is also consistent with the shift in recent years to
have more social policies enacted through the Code rather than
government requirements or direct services.240 Providing a tax credit
would represent a paradigmatic shift in the state of the current law,
which has focused on dealing with domestic violence through the
criminal justice system and violence prevention through protection
orders.241 By contrast, offering a tax credit does not involve a criminal or
civil court to respond to domestic violence. Rather, it presents the
government with a way to involve employers and invite them to be a part
of the solution when domestic violence impacts their workplaces without
going to court.242 More than a reactive legal response is needed to combat
the multiple ways in which violence has infiltrated the workplace. In this
respect, a tax credit is an important part of a coordinated effort to address
the problem from multiple angles.243
Indeed, encouraging or assisting women’s workforce
participation through tax credits is not a new concept. The most
discussed example is the Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”).244 It
provides a refundable tax credit that reduces or eliminates taxes on lowincome married or single working people.245 The EITC is phased out as
income rises to ensure the credit is taken by only those with low
income.246 It does not provide a specific dollar amount, but rather
contains a range depending on the recipients’ marital status and number
of dependent children present in the immediate family.247

“that coordination between tax rules and other legal rules could draw on the diverse strengths of
different legal regimes to expand the institutional options for feminist legal reform”).
240
See, e.g., Tax Policy Center, Working Families, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/WorkingFamilies.cfm (last visited Jan. 14, 2008) (“Over the past 15 years, federal tax policy has come to
play a central role in the well-being of these families.”).
241
See generally Ann E. Freedman, Fact-Finding in Civil Domestic Violence Cases:
Secondary Traumatic Distress and the Need for Compassionate Witnesses, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 567, 587-92 (2003) (discussing the current “emphasis on criminal law remedies
[that] dominates much of our public discourse on domestic violence”); see also SCHNEIDER, supra
note 172, at 197 (noting that tax credits would be “an important antidote to the criminalization
emphasis . . . and represent a different form of state involvement and assistance”).
242
Yoram Margalioth, The Many Faces of Mandates: Beyond Traditional
Accommodation Mandates and Other Classic Cases, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645, 692 (2003) (“Tax
advantages are given to taxpayers as a means of inducing certain behaviors perceived by the
policymaker to be desirable.”).
243
Alstott, supra note 237, at 2066 (“[C]oordination between tax policy and other legal
regimes can expand the available menu of policy options by drawing on the diverse strengths of
different legal regimes.”).
244
26 U.S.C. § 32 (2000). The EITC began in 1975 and has been expanded over the
years. See generally STEVE HOLT, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, RESEARCH BRIEF: THE EARNED
INCOME TAX CREDIT AT 30: WHAT WE KNOW (2006); Alstott, supra note 237, at 2038-39
(articulating a feminist view of the EITC).
245
Jonathan Barry Forman, Earned Income Credit, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION
AND TAX POLICY 99-100 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 1999), available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/
publications/url.cfm?ID=1000524.
246
See 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2000).
247
Id. § 32(b).
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In addition to the EITC, tax credits have been proposed for any
number of social policies in an effort to incentivize employers to do
something that is good for society. For example, Illinois created a
financial incentive for employers to hire more veterans with a state tax
credit of up to $600 per veteran hired.248 Missouri established a tax credit
for employer contributions to domestic violence shelters that may be
used to offset the state income tax, corporate franchise tax, financial
institutions tax, or the tax on the gross receipts of express companies by
up to 50% of qualified contributions of up to $2 million annually.249
These are just two of many examples of this policy-making-through-taxcredit function.
This proposal also avoids some of the usual criticisms of tax
credits. The most common criticism is that tax credits reward businesses
that would otherwise be taking the same actions without the credit
(mostly large employers).250 But that would not be the case here. The
reality is that the majority of employers are not doing anything to prevent
or address domestic violence in the workplace. Even though a recent
survey found that 94% of corporate security personnel at Fortune 100
companies believe domestic violence is a major security concern,251
“[o]ver 70 percent of United States workplaces have no formal program
or policy that addresses workplace violence,” and only 44% of those that
do have a program or policy address domestic violence.252 As Verizon’s
Public Affairs Manager recently put it, “[t]he employer’s job is to
provide access to resources and to be able to ‘recognize, respond, and

248

35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/217(a) (2000); see also Business and Legal Reports, Inc.,
Illinois: State Institutes Tax Credit for Hiring Veterans, available at http://www.blr.com/display_shrm.cfm/
topic/178/state/117 (last visited Dec. 23, 2007).
Illinois also created a program to promote the Veteran’s Tax Credit in an effort to
make the credit useful. See Press Release, Office of the Governor, Gov. Blagojevich Encourages
Employers to Hire Veterans During “Hire a Vet” Month in Illinois, Nov. 1, 2007,
http://www.revenue.state.il.us/AboutIdor/PressReleases/PR-11-01-2007.pdf; Business and Legal
Reports, Inc., supra.
249
MO. ANN. STAT. § 135.550 (West 2000); see also Missouri Grants Tax Credits, NAT’L
BULL. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PREVENTION (West), Sept. 1999 (noting the new Missouri tax credit
that allows taxpayers to receive a credit of up to 50% of the amount they donate to a domestic
violence shelter); S.B. 1471, 208th Leg. (N.J. 1998) (employers may reduce their gross income tax
by 50% of contributions to domestic violence shelters of at least $100).
250
See, e.g., Tax Incentives and the Cal. Economy: Joint Hearing Before the S. and
Assemb. Comms. on Revenue and Taxation, 1993 Leg., 1993-1994 Sess. (Cal. 1993), available at
http://www.nathannewman.org/EDIN/.econ/.cch/.cch-goldb.html (statement of Lenny Goldberg,
Executive Director, California Tax Reform Association) (“Tax incentives reward activity which
would otherwise take place.”).
251
Charlene Marmer Solomon, Talking Frankly About Domestic Violence, 74
PERSONNEL J. 62, 64 (1995); see also ALABAMA COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE &
VERIZON WIRELESS, supra note 12, at 1, 4; EMPLOYERS AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note
32 (citing this statistic from the National Safe Workplace Institute).
252
Half of Large Employers Had Workplace Violence Incident in Last Year, BUS. &
LEGAL REP., Oct. 30, 2006, http://hr.blr.com/news.aspx?id=19318 (citing a survey conducted by
Bureau of Labor Statistics for NIOSH); see also SAFE Act, H.R. 2395, 110th Cong. § 2(11) (2007)
(further noting that “only 4 percent of employers provided training on domestic violence”).
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refer’” to domestic violence at work.253 Unfortunately, not enough
employers know how to or are doing this.
Violence at work is often predictable and preventable. “The most
important function of a workplace violence prevention program is to
make sure it includes ‘an early detection mechanism and a wellcoordinated response . . . .’”254 Employers may (and some do) voluntarily
perform this function.255 Increased publicity of particular incidents of and
costs associated with domestic violence and the real risk of employer
liability have caused a number of organizations to start working to create
workplaces that truly respond to employees’ safety needs.256 These
efforts—along with the National Workplace Resource Center when it
becomes operational—could provide the important steps of offering
model employers and best practices. This could go a long way to educate
employers and provide them with the information they need to
“recognize, respond, and refer” to domestic violence. As noted above, it
also could be a vital resource and potential referral partner for the IRS
personnel funded under this proposal. But some employers with
successful prevention programs may be unwilling to share their strategies
with others in response to privacy and proprietary concerns.257 And
neither the existence of these model policies nor a national resource
center that captures them is sufficient by itself to encourage others to
follow these examples or use the center.258 This proposal, however, goes
one step further in encouraging employers to develop a plan before

253
When Domestic Violence Comes to Work, Verizon Wireless, Gap Have Response
Plans, OSHA Rep. (BNA), Apr. 26, 2007, at 370.
254
Workplace Violence, supra note 57 (quoting Mark Braverman, a workplace violence
consultant from Bethesda, MD).
255
Corporate
Alliance
to
End
Partner
Violence,
Best
Practices,
http://www.caepv.org/getinfo/bestprac.php (last visited Jan. 14, 2008) (providing a list of some
member businesses that voluntarily perform these functions; examples of the practices found at each
company can be located by clicking on the name of the company); LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH
EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: A SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY,
MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE 129-30 (2008).
256
Swanberg et al., supra note 1, at 299, 300-01 (noting that “some” organizations have
acted to combat the impact of violence at work as a result of awareness of the “problem and its
associated economic and social costs and consequences” and further “suggest[ing] that a concern to
‘keep talent, reduce absenteeism, and avoid liability’ has been moving organizations to take action”
(quoting J. Pereira, Employers Confront Domestic Abuse, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1995, at B1);
FARMER & TIEFENTHALER, supra note 26, at 31.
257
NIOSH, supra note 60, § 2.1.6.
258
It also fails to address some of the problems that exist when the government elects to
outsource a public good like this. For examples of problems outsourcing may cause, see Jessica
Holzer, Pay-go Could Stymie Efforts to End Private Tax Program, THEHILL.COM, May 14, 2007
(discussing congressional efforts to block an outsourcing plan through the appropriation process);
David Cay Johnston, I.R.S. Enlists Help in Collecting Delinquent Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2006
(discussing the IRS’s plan to outsource the collection of past-due taxes from those who owe $25,000
or less); Bill Leonard, EEOC Kills Call Center Contract, Warns of Slow Service, SHRM HR NEWS,
Nov. 14, 2007, http://www.shrm.org/hrnews_published/articles/CMS_023662.asp (discussing
problems with the outsourcing of the EEOC’s call center).
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violence occurs and have an appropriate and prompt response ready if
violence happens.259
A permutation of this critique is that it is not good public policy
to reward bad actors. Certain employers may create a violence
prevention and education program or policy only in response to a citation
or lawsuit. The question becomes whether these “bad” entities should be
offered a financial reward for actions they would take anyway in
responding to the incident underlying an existing or prior citation or
lawsuit. One state bill attempted to deal with this concern by allowing
only employers that could demonstrate that they had not been cited
recently under the OSH Act to be considered an eligible employer such
that they could receive the proposed tax credit.260 The underlying premise
of this exclusion was that these employers would not need additional
incentive because the occurrence of a violent incident or actual or
threatened lawsuit would be incentive enough.261 However, there is still a
need to encourage these employers not to merely react to the case at
hand, but rather to create a comprehensive approach that would address a
variety of situations and consider the needs of other and future
employees.
Some people have argued that tax credits do not provide enough
“bang for the buck.”262 Essentially, this posits that the amount of money
that would need to be used to properly incentivize employers and
administer the tax credit is too large. The positive outcomes that would
result from the tax credit are not worth it when weighed against the
financial and other costs that might be saved by employers and their
employees who benefit from the employers’ actions. Without having
additional information, it is difficult to estimate precisely how much the
proposed tax credit would cost or the exact amount of economic utility
the proposal has in terms of how much and which costs utilizing the
259

Campbell & Karin, supra note 2, at 7 (describing the elements of a “well-written antiviolence policy”).
260
H.B. 919, Gen. Assem., 2003 Sess. § 105-129.16(b)(1) (N.C. 2003) (defining an
eligible employer as one “that certifies that, as of the time the employer first claims the credit, at the
business location with respect to which the credit is claimed, the employer has no citations under the
[OSH] Act that have become a final order within the past three years for willful serious violations or
for failing to abate serious violations”); S.B. 680, Gen. Assem., 2003 Sess. § 105-129.16(b)(1) (N.C.
2003) (same).
261
Michele Abbott, North Carolina Labor Commissioner Touts Safety Reform Initiative,
HIGH POINT ENTERPRISE, June 1, 2003 (describing bi-partisan support for the bill because it offers a
“carrot” to encourage voluntary efforts for increased workplace safety rather than a “stick” in the
usual form of a citation).
262
See, e.g., Sheldon S. Cohen, The Erwin N. Griswold Lecture, 14 AM. J. TAX POL’Y
113, 121 (1997) (criticizing a tax credit proposed by President Clinton for educational expenses in
part because scholarship or student loans would have provided “a bigger bang for the bucks”); see
also Katherine Pratt, Deficits and the Dividend Tax Cut: Tax Policy as the Handmaiden of Budget
Policy, 41 GA. L. REV. 503, 565 (2007) (providing a formula to measure how much “bang for the
buck” a “stimulative effect of a tax cut or spending increase” has by determining “the ratio of the
stimulative effect of the tax cut (or spending program) divided by the revenue loss (or budget
costs)”).
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credit would save. In part, this is because every dollar that the
government would spend on this tax credit is a dollar it cannot spend on
something else. This limitation, however, would apply to almost
anything the government does. The government is always forced to make
choices in determining resource allocation. At least until the costs and
benefits of the proposal can be measured,263 the proposed credit is a
choice worth pursuing. The costs of continued inaction are too great.
Of course, Congress could impose any number of limitations on
the proposal to tailor the targeted population and limit the amount of
money spent for this purpose. For example, specific requirements that
limit the amount of money spent on this tax credit or further limit the
scope of employers eligible to utilize it ultimately could range from
including a monetary limit above which expenses would not be eligible
for the credit to imposing a “reasonableness requirement” on eligible
expenses to removing the “refundable” aspect of the tax credit.264
A related criticism of tax credits focuses on the amount of
money it costs to properly administer and enforce a tax credit. The U.S.
tax system is based on voluntary reporting and payment.265 There is little
direct enforcement and “minimal interaction with the government.”266 As
a result, this system has “both unintentional taxpayer errors and
intentional taxpayer evasion.”267 When combined with other factors, a tax
gap—“the difference between the amount of tax that taxpayers should

263

Federal legislation regularly includes some form of study requirement, often paired
with a reevaluation period. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 2631-2636 (1993) (creating a Commission on
Leave with a mandate to report back to Congress with findings from a comprehensive study of the
costs, benefits, policies, and programs related to a variety of time off issues and the impact of some
of the new law’s provisions).
264
See, e.g., Employer-Provided Child Care Credit, 26 U.S.C. § 45F(b) (2006) (creating a
cap of $150,000 per taxable year for this credit); Disabled Access Tax Credit, 26 U.S.C. § 44(a)
(2006) (providing small businesses with a 50% credit on the first $10,000 (excluding the first $250
spent)); Disabled Access Tax Credit, 26 U.S.C. § 44(c)(3) (2006) (allowing small businesses to
include “only expenditures which are reasonable and . . . not include expenditures which are
unnecessary to accomplish” compliance with the ADA). Any of these could be used to limit the
amount of money the government spends on this tax credit in lieu of or in combination with a cap on
the tier-system based on the size of employer (or income generated per year) proposed above.
265
“The vast majority of Americans pay their taxes accurately . . . .” IRS, IRS Updates
Tax Gap Estimates, Feb. 14, 2006, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=154496,00.html
(quoting former IRS Commissioner Mark W. Everson) (internal quotation marks omitted); IRS,
REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP: A REPORT ON IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 1 (2007).
266
For example, the IRS audited 59,516 businesses in FY 2007, even though over nine
million filed returns. IRS, Fiscal Year 2007 Enforcement and Services Results,
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=177701,00.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2009); IRS, Fiscal
Year 2007 IRS Enforcement and Service Statistics, 6, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsnews/irs_enforcement_and_service_tables_fy_2007.pdf.
267
IRS, REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP, supra note 265, at 3. Noncompliance exists
“due to tax law complexity that results in errors of ignorance, confusion, and carelessness. . . at this
point, the IRS does not have sufficient data to distinguish clearly the amount of noncompliance that
arises from willful, as opposed to unintentional, mistakes. Moreover, the line between intentional
and unintentional mistakes is often a grey one, particularly in areas such as basis reporting, where a
taxpayer may know that his or her reporting is inaccurate but does not have ready access to accurate
information.” Id. at 6.
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pay and the amount that is paid voluntarily and on time”—results.268
Former IRS Commissioner Mark Everson illustrated the importance of
this concept when he noted that “the magnitude of the tax gap highlights
the critical role of enforcement in keeping our system of tax
administration healthy.”269 There is no reason to think that compliance
with this tax credit, including the filing, reporting, and payment, would
be any greater or less than the compliance associated with other tax
credits. But the additional allocation of money for enforcement purposes
in the earmark to IRS is intended to combat this problem and ensure that
the tax gap related to this credit is kept to a minimum or is at least as
small as possible under the circumstances.
An alternative proposal could be proffered that would require
employers to create a written domestic violence prevention program.
This alternative model exists in a number of state and local jurisdictions
that have enacted laws in this vein recently. For example, the New York
State Workplace Prevention Act requires public employers to develop a
written prevention program and implement annual training on workplace
violence.270 This type of requirement has tended to focus on the
government as employer and not the government in its role as rule maker
for private employers. Thus, while these types of laws may be useful,
particularly for the government workforce which would not be
incentivized by a tax credit as an entity without tax liability, it is hard to
imagine a federal law requiring private employers to draft a domestic
violence prevention plan at this time.271 But even in the unlikely event
that such a law was enacted, employers would need to go beyond the
pages of a written plan itself and take steps to protect employees and
others when the policies are or should be activated. Moreover, employers
are more likely to take ownership over safety issues if there is an element

268
IRS, The Tax Gap, available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=158619,00.html
(last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (“The tax gap can also be thought of as the sum of non-compliance with
the tax law.”). Only a small percentage (about 10%) of the tax gap comes from underreporting from
businesses. The Tax Policy Center, THE TAX POLICY BRIEFING BOOK, The Tax Gap: What is the tax
gap? (2008), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/background/tax-gap/what-is.cfm.
269
IRS, IRS Updates Tax Gap Estimates (Feb. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=154496,00.html.
270
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 27-b (2007); see also Sharon N. Berlin, The New York State
Workplace Violence Prevention Act, 32 NYSBA LAB. & EMP. NEWSL. 16 (2007) (explaining the
new law). Eliot Spitzer also signed an Executive Order that requires state employers to develop
written policies addressing domestic violence in hopes of “fundamentally chang[ing] the way New
York State prevents and responds to domestic violence . . . [by] taking a proactive approach
toward . . . creating a safer and more productive working environment.” Press Release, N.Y. State
Executive Chamber, New York State Enhances Domestic Violence Prevention Efforts (Oct. 25,
2007), http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/1025072.html; N.Y. Exec. Order No. 19 (Oct. 22, 2007)
(noting that the state should serve as a model employer for private businesses).
271
Such a requirement could be proposed as an OSH Act regulation. See supra note 55
(discussing OSHA’s position on workplace violence). The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act’s Privacy Rule, which requires covered entities to create a written privacy policy
and designate an employee responsible for implementing that policy, is another potential regulatory
source for certain employers. 45 C.F.R. § 160.310(a) (2007).
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of choice and decide to act themselves—even if they elect to do so based
on a monetary incentive provided by the government.272
CONCLUSION
It is time for society to recognize three facts. First, domestic
violence has a significant impact on the workplace. Second, the structure
of the workplace has a role to play in reducing the impact of violence on
employees and employers. Third, the federal government has a critical
role to play in pushing all members of the workplace to accept and
embrace their roles.273
The statutory solution proposed in this Article would help
federal law recognize and reflect these facts. States have begun to
address some of the structural and legal gaps in the workplace’s response
to domestic violence.274 These new state protections provide excellent
momentum for a response by the federal government. After canvassing
the movement that has been made on these issues at the state level, the
proposals described in this Article will move the debate away from the
employee-focused and/or reactive “incident-focused” criminal
response.275 They attempt to change the current structure of the
workplace in a way that breaks the wall of silence and allows both
employees and employers to effectively prepare for and respond to
domestic violence.
This societal approach is the logical and necessary next step to
addressing domestic violence. Protecting employers would increase the
support these bills receive on the Hill.276 By re-framing the bills to
acknowledge the employers’ role, giving employers the ability to seek
preventive protection orders, and creating tax incentives, the proposals
give employers the tools and incentives to address this problem.277
272
Lettieri et al., supra note 53, at 2 (“Employers will be more likely to adopt policies
that support victims of domestic violence if they are rewarded with incentives and recognition.”); id.
at 1, 3.
273
Congress can do more than it is currently doing to “push [employers] to protect
victims of domestic violence.” Domestic Violence Spills Into Workplace, but Senate Witnesses
Disagree on Solutions, 25 Human Res. Rep. (BNA) 439 (Apr. 23, 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (noting that several witnesses at the hearing agreed this was needed).
274
See supra Part II.
275
Vu, supra note 173, at 103 (noting that courts use an “incident-focused” definition of
domestic violence).
276
Employer support has helped some of the new state provisions addressing domestic
violence at work become law. For example, the Maine Commissioner’s testimony at the Senate
Hearing demonstrates the good that can be done when employers and employees are brought to the
table. She noted that employers were included in the “conversation,” and the state Chamber of
Commerce supported a recent expansion to the victim leave law in part because they had received
“no complaints or concerns [with the earlier law’s] implementation.” Senate Hearing, supra note 29
(statement of Laura A. Fortman, citing the 2002 testimony of Peter Gore, Senior Governmental
Affairs Specialist, Maine State Chamber of Commerce).
277
For a description of how having a federal law can empower victims of violence, see
Widiss, supra note 25 (manuscript at 15) (“[B]ecause of the expressive power of legal reform,
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Having these proposals in the SEES and SAFE Act bills would not only
elevate the level of and validate an employer’s right to be involved, but it
would do so in a way that would improve employees’ chances of
obtaining leave that can be used to address medical concerns, safety
planning, and court appearances. Importantly, the proposals would still
help empower victim employees to maintain their economic selfsufficiency. But the proposals also would encourage employers to take
action to protect and make the workplace safer for themselves, their
employees, and other third parties.
Moreover, the proposals are geared to help employers rethink
their current response to a problem that is causing them significant
detriment. The status quo of ignoring the “private” problem of domestic
violence or taking actions that have potential negative legal and practical
implications (like firing an employee that is the target of domestic
violence in hopes of maintaining a safe workplace) cannot continue. This
Article challenges employers to consider a smarter course of action given
the impact domestic violence has on them and their employees, and
encourages the federal government to change—or at least supplement—
the existing, inadequate legal tools available to employees and employers
to address this problem.
In this regard, these proposals are not about providing a favor to
a female employee by stepping into her personal situation. They are
about creating a better way for businesses and society to address the
problem domestic violence causes in the workplace. In sum, the
proposals would transform the current individual-focused response into a
legislative vehicle that recognizes and respects the roles and
responsibilities of a variety of stakeholders. In so doing, the proposals—
and therefore the national conversation on this issue—acknowledge that
domestic violence is a societal problem to which the federal government
must respond in a way that supports the needs of both employees and
employers to be a part of the solution. It is time for society to
comprehensively address the effects of domestic violence.278

passing laws that protect victims of domestic violence from losing their jobs has an impact beyond
the specific substantive protections they provide.”).
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After observing that Illinois’s VESSA “seems to be a step in the right direction,”
Nicole Buonocore Porter concluded her 2006 article by noting, “As to whether [a comprehensive
domestic violence] statute should be enacted on a federal level, that question is left for another day.”
Porter, supra note 6, at 330. My argument in this Article is that the answer to that question is “yes,”
and the time to answer it is now.

